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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Energy Resources, Conservation and Development Commission
(Energy Commission) is one of the youngest of California•s major
0

state agencies.

Created by the 1974 Warren-Alquist Act, it began

operating in the early months of 1975.

Significantly, , the new

Commission was not the result of an amalgamation or reorganization
of existing state departments.

Its responsibilities were truly

new and its very existence was the result of a vigorously debated
decision made jointly by a Republican governor and a Democratic
legislature.

Its basic charge was fourfold:

to forecast electrici-

ty demand; to prescribe electricity conservation measures; to promote the development of new technologies for generating electricity; and to approve sites for new power plants.
To carry out its assigned tasks, the Commission was assigned
some duties whtch can be described as "administrative•• and others
which can be described as "regulatory".
ADMINISTRATIVE DUTIES
Biennially, the Commission is required to prepare an
initial or preliminary forecast which identifies electrical energy demands within each utility service area
over 5-, 12- and 20-year periods.
The Commission is required to propose various electricity
conservation measures, such as residential and non-residential building standards, efficiency standards for
I

heating, air conditioning and other appliances, insulation standards, load management programs, etc.
The Commission is required to promote the development
of new technologies for electricity generation, such as
solar, wind, biomass, and geothermal.

REGULATORY DUTIES
The Commission is required to adopt a final energy forecast after appropriate public debate and critique of the
initial forecast.
The Commission is required to adopt conservation regulations after appropriate public debate and critique of
its proposed regulations.
The Commission is to approve new power plant sites after
appropriate public debate and critique of sites proposed
by utilities.
The four fundamental responsibilities of the Commission are
clearly synergistic.

Conservation programs and new energy tech-

nologies are intended to reduce electricity demand and consequently
reduce the number of conventional new power plants needed within
California.

When a utility does claim a need for a new facility,

however, the Commission's forecast will validate that claim and
the siting procedure will provide an orderly and expeditious decision on the most appropriate location for the facility.
It is axiomatic, however, that new institutions seldom perform

e~actly

as their planners anticipated.
II

Contingencies and

circumstances, unforeseen and unforeseeable at the inception of
a new agency, inevitably affect its subsequent performance.

In

short, now that the Energy Commission has had four years of operating experience, prudent administration of the public's business
requires an evaluation of its initial performance.
bility for

th~t

The responsi-

evaluation falls inescapably on the Legislature--

because the Legislature was the principal architect of the WarrenAlquist Act and because only the Legislature can initiate change
in the

st~tute

which regulates and directs the Commission's activi-

ties.
Assembly Concurrent Resolution 177 (Resolution Chapter 145,
Statutes of 1978) established the Joint Legislative Committee on
Energy Policy and Implementation for the express purpose of evaluating the Energy Commission's performance and reporting the results of that evaluation to the appropriate standing committee
of each House of the Legislature.

The staff of the Joint Commit-

tee hereby summarizes the major points of its evaluation and submits that evaluation to the Joint Committee for use in reaching
its final decision.

Accompanying this general summary is a com-

plete staff report containing detailed findings, conclusions, data
and examples which are not appropriately included in a summary
document.
FINDINGS
I.

THE COMMISSION'S PERFORMANCE
1.

The basic insight of the architects of the Warren-Alquist
III

Act was, and remains, sound.

The four major responsibili-

ties identified in the Act--viz. forecasting, conservation,
development of alternative energy sources and locating new
energy facilities--are essential ingredients in any program
that seeks to manage electricity growth in California.
2.

The Energy Commission's conservation programs have been
significant factors in reducing the historical rate of
increase in demand for electrical energy.

Its innovative

forecasting methodology has substantially increased the
accuracy of determining future demand for electricity.
3.

The Energy Commission, with the cooperation and support
of California's utilities, has taken the initiative in
successfully proposing legislation to eliminate significant shortcomings in Commission procedures for locating
power plant sites (SB 1859-Chapter 1013, Statutes of 1978}.
The intent of the new legislation is to limit the issues
which can be raised and debated as part of individual
power plant siting decisions.

For example, when SB 1859

is fully implemented, the adequacy of the biennial energy
demand forecast and the fuel types and technologies available for new power plants will be determined by special
••generic" proceedings conducted prior to the siting proceedings.
4.

Public participation in energy management decisions has

IV

been facilitated by the Commission's unique office of
Public Advisor--an office whose major task is to assist
concerned members of the public in coping with formal
Commission procedures.
II•

DEFICIENCIES IN COMMISSION OPERATIONS
1.

•

Although the architects of the

Warren-Alqui~t

Act were

correct in identifying the four major responsibilities
involved in managing electricity growth {viz. forecasting, conservation, development of alternative energy
sources and site location), they overlooked the inherent
conflict involved in assigning all four responsibilities
to a single commission which would exercise both administrative and adjudicatory authority.

This conflict is

rooted in the fact that developing a proposed forecast,
reviewing a proposed power plant site, proposing conservatton requirements and energy sources--are all
cy11 responsibilities.

11

line agen-

There is, however, an adjudica-

tory role in making a final decision to adopt a forecast, to approve a power plant site or to adopt conservation regulations.

This adjudicatory role is not com-

patible with the line agency role.
Adopting a final forecast of electricity demand, for
example, is an adjudicatory responsibility which requires
fair, dispassionate judgment among competing claims.
At present, however, individual Commissioners participate

v

actively in the development of the proposed forecast.
The same Commissioners are then required by statute to
adjudicate criticisms of the proposed forecast--from
whatever sources, conservation groups, utilities, environmental groups, etc.--before formally adopting the forecast.

In short, existing law seems to assume that Com-

missioners can totally disengage themselves from their
own work product to the extent that they can be dispassionate, uninvolved judges of that work product.
2.

Annually, an increasing amount of the Commission•s personnel and budgetary resources are being committed to
its adjudicatory responsibilities.

The Commission•s

own calendar, in fact, indicates significantly more time
allocated to regulatory activities than to administrative ones.

This trend is not unique to the Commission;

in fact, it seems invariably to occur whenever adjudicatory and administrative responsibilities are assigned
to a single agency.

In the case of the Commission,

however, if the trend is not reversed, conservation and
alternate energy development programs are likely to be
significantly blunted as Commission attention focuses
increasingly on regulatory duties.
3.

An additional shortcoming which emerges from assigning
line agency responsibilities to a commission is that
individual Commissioners tend to assume responsibility

VI

for particular line agency

pr~grams

{e.g., developing

the proposed forecast, promoting alternative energy

0

sources such as solar, etc.).

Naturally enough under

such circumstances, the Commissioner begins to direct
the staff which ts associated with "his" or "her" program.

The result is uncertainty in the agency's chain

of command and uncertainty in the executive director's
statutory authority to direct and employ staff resources.
4.

The assignment of line agency responsibilities to a commission also permits the Governor to avoid establishing
any policy about electricity use in California and to
avoid advocating any specific positions on important
electricity management decisions.

In the case of fore-

casting electricity demand, for example, the Governor
does not have to identify the state policies and other
assumptions which he believes are realistic bases for
determining demand.

Instead, · the statute assigns this

duty to five commissioners who, by virtue of their term
appointments, are not directly accountable to the Governor.

Current criticism may well be true that guberna-

torial positions on electricity management issues are
difficult to discern or discover.

Existing law, however,

does not require a Governor to take any such positions
and, in fact, rather invites him not to do so.
5.

In spite of the procedural improvements mandated by
VII

SB 1895, there is no point in the electrical energy
management process at which a utility's overall resource
plan is reviewed.

Such a review could be mutually bene-

ficial to the state, to the utilities themselves, and
to various groups who today find themselves in an adversary relationship to utilities on specific
tion decisions.

si~e

loca-

Such a review would provide all groups

with an early forum in which to debate the reasonableness of the entirety of a utility's resource plan.
Most important, this debate would take place in advance
of a utility's request to site a specific power plant.
The unfortunate aspect of existing law is that debate
on the reasonableness of a resource plan is forced to
occur within the context of procedures to designate a
site for a proposed power plant.

By the time the site

designation process occurs, a utility is sufficiently
committed to a particular facility that, as a practical
matter, a reasonable examination of alternatives is
severely limited.
If utility resource plans are subjected to an initial,
11 preliminary" approval procedure, debate about alternatives would occur before a utility has made an irrevocable business commitment to a specific facility.

More-

over, the specific power plants identified in an "approved11 resource plan could be located expeditiously
VIII

w~en

ing

t~e
t~e

time for their construction occurred by limitscope of the siting procedure.

RECOMMENDATIONS
1.

Department of Energy

The Warren-Alquist Act accurately

identifies the critical line agency components of a
state program to manage electricity growth.

I

Responsi-

bility for these line agency activities, however, should
not be assigned to an adjudicatory commission, but rather
to a true line agency--a Department of Energy.
Such an institutional reorganization would ensure the
development of responsible state positions on electricity
growth policy and on individual power plant siting decisions.

The Department Director, and ultimately the

Governor, would be directly responsible for policy positions.

Most important, the validity of Department

positions would be tested in an adjudicatory proceeding
conducted by a body which has not been directly involved
with, or committed to, development of the positions
themselves.
2.

Energy Commission

The Warren-Alquist Act has accu-

rately identified the need for adjudication procedures
in any state program to manage electricity growth.
Specifically, the decision establishing a final, state-

IX

approved electricity demand forecast, the decision identifying available fuel types, decisions adopting final
conservation regulations, and decisions involving individual power plant locations--all require adjudication
by as impartial a body as possible.

The Energy Commis-

sion and its adjudicatory staff should be retained to
perform this vital function.

The Commission should no

longer be responsible for any line agency functions
which would cloud its adjudicatory impartiality.

These

functions, together with the current Commission's line
agency staff positions would be transferred to a new
Department of Energy.
3.

Resource Plans

In order to facilitate the siting of

needed new electrical generating facilities, one new
step should be required in the state's electricity growth
management process.
three steps:

(1)

At present, that process involves
an official state forecast of elec-

tricity demand; (2) an official state determination of
the fuel alternatives available for new power plants;
and (3) individual power plant site designation.

A large

gap exists between the first two steps of the process
and the final site designation.

A utility, for example,

may know that a new facility is justified by the electricity forecast.

It also knows the fuel types it may

choose to use for that facility.

X

Currently, however,

it must watt until the siting phase of the process to
receive any indication whether the general location,
timing, specific fuel type, or capacity of a proposed
new facility is reasonable.
A new procedural step is needed.

Once the state has

adopted an electricity demand forecast and has desig-

•

nated the fuel types generally available for new power
plants, utilities should be required to submit their
resource plans to the Energy Commission for review and
approval.

Such submission would trigger an adjudicatory

process in which the utility, the Department of Energy,
consumer groups, environmental groups, and others could
review and debate the reasonableness of the entire resource plan.

Once such a plan had been approved, a util-

ity could, and should, receive an expedited decision on
a siting proposal consistent with that plan.
This approach would focus debate on the truly pivotal
point in an electricity supply management process--viz.
a utility's resource plan.

It would provide both the

opportunity and the means to develop and validate contingency plans for a number of alternatives for meeting
future electricity demand.

Those facilities which time

and circumstances proved most practicable could then be
selected for construction as they were needed.

XI

(Under this approach, a utility could still request
approval of a facility not included in an "approved••
resource plan.

Expedited siting for such a facility,

however, should not, and would not, be applicable.)
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PROPOSED ENERGY AGENCY REORGANIZATION
EXISTING ENERGY
COMMISSION
FUNCTIONS

NEW DEPARTMENT
OF ENERGY
FUNCTIONS

Preparation/Adoption
of Biennial Report

Adoption of Forecast
and Supply Element

Prepartion of
Biennial Report

Preparation/Adoption
of Electrical Forecast

Adopt (Adjudicate)
Electrical Forecast

~~~e~~~u~~r:~~!~"l
Forecast

Energy Trend/Impact
Ana l'Ysi s

Energy Trend/Impact
Analysis

Engineering Anaysis of
Power Plant Proposals

Engineering Analysis of
Power Plant Proposals

Site Screening/Reviews

Site Screening Reviews

Review/Certification
of Power Plants

Decis i on on Certification of Power Plants

Determination/Analysis of
Available Technologies

Adjudicate Determination
of Available
Technologies

Analysi.s of Technologies: Costs, Environmental Impact, etc.

Examination of Utility
Resources Plans

Adoption of Plans

Analysis and
Alternatives to Plans

Development/Adoption of
Conservation Regulations
(building, appliance,
load management)

Adoption of Conservation
Regulations

Proposal and
Formulation of
Regulations

P.romote/Operate
Conservation Programs

Promote/Operate
Conservation Programs

Enforcement of Conservation Standards

Enforcement of Conservation Standards

Development/Adoption
of Solar Standards

D

REVISED ENERGY
COMMISSION
FUNCTIONS

Adopt i on of Solar
Standards

Development/Enforcement of Solar
Standards

Research and Development
of Alternative Energy
Sources

Research and Development
of Alternative Energy
Sources

Proposals for AJternatives to New Facilities

Proposals for Alternatives to New Facilities

* Long-range gas forecasting transferred from PUC.
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INTRODUCTION
Assembly Concurrent Resolution (ACR) 177 (Resolution
Chapter 145, Statutes of 1978) created the Joint Committee on
Energy Policy and Implementation.

ACR 177 requires the Joint

Committee to submit to the Legislature its analysis of the "current effectiveness of the State Energy Resources Conservation
I

and Development Commission" (Commission} and alternatives for
reorganizing the Commission to provide for

11

increased clarity

and cohesion in establishing state energy policy and implementing
such policy".

Among the alternatives which the Joint Committee

must consider are:

1) reorganizing the Commission; 2) replacing

the Commission with a new or alternate state agency; 3) reallocating the state's energy-related functions among the Commission,
the Public Utilities Commission, the State Air Resources Board,
the California Coastal Commission, and the State Water Resources
Control Board.

ACR 177 also created an Advisory Committee to

make recommendations on these alternatives as well as other
alternatives the Advisory Committee chose to consider.
This report sets forth the staff's analysis and recommendations concerning alternatives for reorganization and is intended
to provide a basis for the Joint Committee's recommendations to
the Legislature on the reorganization of the state's energyrelated functions.
The report is divided into five parts:
1)

Findinqs and recommendations.

1

2}

A history of the Warren-Alquist Act.

3}

A description of the Energy Commission's functions
and its relations with other state agencies

4}

A discussion of the Advisory Committee's activities.

5}

The staff analysis of the Commission's effectiveness
and of the alternatives for reorganization listed in
ACR 177.

2

FINDINGS
Policy and Planning
o

The basic insight of the architects of the Warren-Alquist
Act was, and remains, sound.

The four major responsi-

bilities identified in the Act--viz. forecasting, . conservation, development of alternative energy sources and
locating new energy facilities--are essential ingredients
in any program that seeks to manage electricity growth in
California.
o

However, despite the passage of the Warren-Alquist Act,
California energy policy is not well articulated and it
lacks clarity.

o

State agencies with primary energy-related authority, the
Commission, the Air Resources Board, and the Public
Utilities Commission, frequently pursue policies that
are not well coordinated and may often conflict with one
another.

o

California's energy planning activities have failed to
provide the necessary guidance to the public and private
energy producers and the people of California.

o

Although substantial improvements have been made to

11

open 11

the energy planning process, there is no greater certainty
and coordination in the energy planning process today tha n
existed prior to the creation of the Commission.
3-

o

The Commission's practical ability to implement alternatives to a proposed plant is severely limited.

This

limited flexibility is exacerbated by the fact that in
order for the Commission to meet its statutory obligation
to provide adequate power as indicated by the adopted
forecast, all of the plants proposed in recent utility
resource plans must be approved.
o

The Energy Commission, with the cooperation and support
of California's utilities, has taken the initiative in
successfully proposing legislation to· eliminate several
significant shortcomings in Commission procedures for locating
power plant sites (SB 1859-Chapter 1013, Statutes of 1978).
The recent agreement between the ARB and the Commission
may provide added clarity in the siting process.

o

Recent changes notwithstanding, with its current structure
of energy responsibilities, California will be unable to
provide a clear, coherent, and credible energy decisionmaking process.

Administration and Regulation
o

Combining administrative and regulatory processes in one
agency reduces the credibility of the regulatory process.
It is difficult, if not impossible, for a member of the
Commission to advocate the use of a particular fuel
(i.e., coal, oil, or nuclear) and subsequently remain
impartial and objective in a specific siting case.
4

o

The combination of regulatory and administrative processes
reduces the coherence of program administration and
increases the difficulty of adequately deploying staff
resources.

The practical effect of combining these

processes is that the regulatory activity becomes dominant
at the expense of programs to develop future new energy
sources.
Accountability
o

The present state energy decision-making structure does
not provide sufficient clarity in assigning responsibility
for decisions.

o

Several different state agencies are involved in solar
energy and conservation programs making it difficult to
place responsibility for those programs and making
effective public participation nearly impossible.

o

It is well established that plural .bodies (Energy
Commission and the Public Utilities Commission) generally
cannot provide for the political accountability necessary
to insure responsibility to the public.

o

When the Governor has seen the need for new energy programs,
he has used a line agency form of organization.

Organizational Issues
o

Staff directions have come from the Chairman of the Commission
as well as individual Commissioners with the result that
staff efforts are not well managed.
5

o

The lack of coordination between various agencies has
resulted in a highly inefficient regulatory and planning
process for meeting future energy needs.

o

The present role of the Chairman as staff director has
made unclear the role of the Executive Director.

Alternatives Development
o

The Legislative Analyst and the Auditor General have noted
serious deficiencies in the Energy Commission•s Research
and Alternatives Development Program.

o

The result of an ill-defined alternatives development
program may be the continued reliance on fossil fuels
for power plants.

o

The Energy Commission•s conservation programs has been a
significant factor in reducing the historical rate of
increase in demand for electrical energy.

There is,

however, some concern over the open-ended nature of the
Commission•s conservation mandate.
Public Participation
o

Public participation in energy management decisions has
been facilitated by the Commission•s unique office of
Public Advisor--an office whose major task is to assist
concerned members of the public in coping with formal
Commission procedures.

6

RECOMMENDATIONS
o

The present Commission structure should be substantially
altered.

The present regulatory and administrative

processes should be divided between a Commission and a
Department
o

•

of Energy.

The Commission's responsibilities should be limited to
the regulatory process.

Its primary functions should be

adjudicating forecasts, resource plans, powar plant
siting proposals, and conservation regulations.

It

should have a limited staff to perform these functions.
o

The authority of th.e Energy Commis.sion to overri.de
standards set by state and local ag-enci"es shauld be
reaffirmed by the Legislature.

o

The new Department of Energy should be responsible for
the preparation of the Biennial Report, the development
of long-range electrical and gas forecasts, development
and promotion of conservation and alternative re$ources,
participating as an advocate in the proceedings of the
Commission and Public Utilities Commission and providing
technical and engineering analyses to the Commission and
to all other relevant state agencies.

o The Commission should be required to approve utility
developed resource plans indicating general location,
timing, fuel type, and capacity of new generating
facilities.
7

o

The Public Resources Code should be amended to require
all relevant agencies (ARB, PUC, SWRCB, etc.) to provide
initial determinations, within a specified time, of
feasibility and policy consistency on proposals in the
Biennial Report and the power plant siting cases.

This

would have the effect of placing existing agreements like
that between the ARB and the Commission into law.
o

The existing electrical surcharge should be retained as
a funding source for both the new department and the
Commission.

Discussion
The purpose of this study is to set forth the most appropriate
way of organizing the state's energy-related responsibilities.
The first step is to examine the current organizational structure.
This study will demonstrate that the current structure is
deficient in several areas.

It has not produced a clear and

understandable energy policy; the . planning process is confused,
uncoordinated, and fractured; it is difficult to assign responsibility for energy decisions and planning duties.

Internally, the

Commission lacks clear staff direction and the roles of Commissioners
and staff are confused.
regulatory and

The Warren-Alquist Act has combined the

~dministrative

responsibilities in one agency,

8

r e s u1t i ng i n i nt e r na 1 co nf1 i c t a nd a 1os s of con f i den c e. i. n t h.e
regulatory process.
A review of these problems and the proposed solutions leads
to four major questions:

(1) Why retain the Commission at all?

(2) Should the PUC assume the Commission's functions?

(3)

Why not

simply make minor adjustments in the roles of the staff and
Commissioners to correct the problems which this study points out?
1

(4) Why create a Department of Energy?
Why Retain the Commission?
Elimina~ing

the Commission would not eliminate the need for

a plural body to make the case-by-case decisions on power plant
siting, adoption of a forecast, or conservation regulations.
These issues require an open forum for debate where parties of
differing views can present their arguments before a body of
dispassionate judges.

A plural body allows for a broad repre-

sentation of views and the interplay of various interests.

Since

these issues require final decisions on large societal investments, a plural body may provide for the necessary consensus to
allow decisions to be made with some degree of public acceptance.
The Commission should be retained to perform the regulatory
responsibilities for energy use and development.

The Commission's

responsibilities should be limited to the disposition of these
issues; administrative responsibilities should be removed.
The Commission's duties would be the adjudication of power
plant siting cases to determine questions of fact regarding
need, environmental suitability, economic feasibility, and other
9

related issues.

The Commission•s duties would extend to the

adoption of an electrical demand forecast to determine the level
of future need.

In adopting the forecast, the Commission would

review the evidence and arguments of the utilities, the Department
of Energy, and any other interested party. The Commission would
also be responsible for the approval of an electrical resource plan.
(This proposal will be discussed in more detail in this section
of the report.)

Resource planning would require the state's

utilities to submit their proposed plans to the Commission and
Department, subsequent to the adoption of the forecast.

The

plans would undergo review and would be challenged by other
proposals or comments from the Department of Energy and others.
The consideration of conservation standards and other regulations
would also be the responsibility of the reorganized Commission.
In all these activities, the Commission is to act in a judicial manner, providing an open forum for debate and an atmosphere where evidence can be weighed and judgment applied to
specific cases.

Its primary function would be to make decisions

on particular issues which require a wide range of views and
where various interests are affected by proposed actions.

Thus, the

role of the Commission would be limited to quasi-judicial responsibilities needed to satisfy the regulatory process.
Should the PUC Assume the Commission•s Functions?
It has been proposed that the PUC assume the responsibility
for these regulatory activities.

This would still enable

decisions to be made by a plural body and would consolidate other

10

functions now performed by the PUC with those of

po~er

plant

siting and forecasting.
There are, however, several reasons for not moving these
responsibilities to the PUC.

First, the PUC is not staffed to

perform these functions and would be required to recruit or
transfer from the Commission many indtviduals of varied disciplines.
11

This would undoubtedly be accompanied with the usual

Start-up problems ...

Second, there are several power plant

proposals moving through the regulatory process at the present
time.

If the regulatory process is disrupted, decisions on these

plants may be delayed or be inadequately reviewed and fail to
meet possible subsequent legal challenges.

Third, many of the

present difficulties are the result of poor coordination in
both planning activities and the regulatory processes.

These

may be exacerbated by having a regulatory process in San
Francisco and an administrative process in Sacramento.
assumes the creation of a department.

(This

If all present functions

now held by the Commission are given to the PUC, many of the
noted problems will continue.)

Finally, the Puc•s long tradition

of rate regulation may dominate a process which must consider and
balance environmental, economic, and social considerations.

11

Wh_y not make minor adjustments to th.e present system?
It may also be argued that the present structure ts sound-all it needs is some

11

fine tuning .. to define more carefully

staff's and Commissioners• roles and responsibilities.
nately, such

11

Unfortu-

fine tuning .. will not solve the current deficiencies.

The principal flaw in the current institutional structure
is that both regulatory and administrative processes are performed
by one agency.

This structure gives the same individual the

roles of both judge and advocate; the program developer and advocate is also responsible for adjudication.

This structure

creates internal conflicts which cannot be resolved and reduces
the integrity of the regulatory process.

The Warren-Alquist Act

has improperly placed these two processes together.
For example, the Chairman of the Commission appeared recently
before the State Water Resources Control Board to recommend that
the Department of Water Resources proceed with its coal-fired
power plant proposal and stated that coal is an environmentally
safe fuel.

This action would be proper for a department director

advocating a program or policy, but it is improper for a member
of a quasi-judicial body to promote activity which will be before
that body in a specific case.

(The Department of Water Resources

is expected to file an NOI for this plant.)
Furthermore, to declare, by statute or otherwise, that there
is a distinction between the staff and Commissioners will not
alter the conflicting combination of regulatory and administrative

12

processes.

These processes must

~e

placed in separate agencies.

0

Each agency should have control over tts awn staff and hudgetary
decisions.

To leave the Commissioners with the administrative

controls over staff and budgetary resource a ll ocation will not
alter old patterns.

The Governor has demonstrated that he

requires a vehicle for energy program innovat i on to reflect his
policies.

This requirement can be fulfilled only by a department,

which will provide accountability and hopefully, more efficient
action.

For example, the Governor relies on line agencies, such

as SolarCal, to implement innovative energy policies • . Moreover,
the coordination of planning activities needs a central focus
under the control of the Governor.

Plural bodies cannot

effec~

tively coordinate activities with any degree of coherence.
Why a Department of Energy?
The line-oriented responsibilities currently performed by
the Commission should be given department status and placed
within the Resources Agency.

The Department would assume the

administrative responsibilities of program development and
operation, policy development, analysis, and advocacy.

It would

be led by an appointee of the Governor, serving at the Governor•s
pleasure.
The duties of the Department would be to develop the analyses
necessary for the Biennial Report.

T~is ~ould

require the

Department to analyze energy trends, develop electrical and
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natural gas forecasts and examine the environmental and economic
impacts of various energy development trends and alternatives.
The Department would present this information, along with the
adopted forecast and the approved resources plans in the form of
the Biennial Report . . It would

CBn~tttute

the Governor's . stat~ment of

energy policy. The Department WQUld be responsible for molt of the
state's analytic activities devoted to energy and would perform
the engineering analysis for power plant proposals.

The

Department would analyze and comment on the utilities' applications
for new facilities before the Commission.
In addition, the Department would be responsible for the
energy-related developmental and promotional activities. in state
government.

Proposing conservation regulations to the Commission

and operating promotional programs, such as education and outreach activities, would be the responsibility of the Department.
The research and promotion of alternative energy sources is
another duty the Department would assume.

The Department should

assume the responsibilities now performed by the SolarCal Office
and the Office of Appropriate Technology (OAT). 1
This study will show that the combination of regulatory and
administrative processes in one agency is an ineffective institutional structure.

Program operation and development require

a more traditional line agency structure.
are not used for these purposes.

Plural bodies generally

A 1965 study by the Little

Hoover Commission on the use of boards and commissions in the

14

0

Resources Agency stated, "A general observation and recommendation
(is), that plural bodies normally not be used to administer, ,
manage, direct, or operate a program.

The case for a single,

responsible executive in this capacity is well documented."2
The Legislative Analyst and tne Auditor General have noted the
difficulties experienced by the

E~e~g~

Commission in providing

clear priorities and effective management in the alternative
research and development program.3

Program development and

operation need direct, accountable action.

Responsibility for

their management should not be divided among several co-equal
commission members.
The Governor should have

responsibility, and the adminis-

t~e

trative machinery, for executing policy, coordinating energy
activity, and implementing new programs.
a

n~w

program he does not turn to

t~e

When the Governor initiates

Commission.

He has created

both the SolarCal Council and the SolarCal Office to encourage
and promote solar energy.

The Office of Appropriate Technology

was created to promote the design of structures and processes
which utilize renewable resources.

In

1977~

the federal government

requested proposals for an Energy Extension Service, a large
energy conservation effort.

The Governor named the State Architect

as the lead responsible agency.

(For the state\smost recent effort

in this area, OAT is the lead agency.)
A

department · ~tructure

can increase efficiency and coordination.

Budgets can receive more expeditious approval, contracts can be
15

executed more quickly, and staff receive clear direction in a
line agency.

Business can be conducted in an administrative

fashion rather than jn a courtroom setting which can be costly
and time consuming.

Since a department is led by one person,

it can formulate policy and interagency agreements withDut the
necessary delay and debate encountered in a plural body.

Clear

leadership and the absence of the need to develop a consensus
means that staff resources can be more appropriately used and
priorities clearly established along programmatic lines.

The

department director can be directly accountable to the Governor
and can draw on executive authority to provide coordination with
other energy agencies.
Adjudicatory bodies place primary emphasis upon regulatory
activity.

If one agency is given both regulatory and adminis-

trative roles, there is a shift of resources toward the regulatory
activities.

An examination of the Energy Commission's calendar

during any month will illustrate the amount of time spent on
regulatory activities.

For example, the Commission's calendar

indicates that from January 29 to March 28, 1979, the Commission
will devote 75 percent of its activity to siting and regulatory
cases. The Commission's budget propos.qls., in the pas.t tw...o yeqrs. ttaye
reduced the promot.ional acttviti.es.
latory activities.

· sub..stat~tially

more thlln the. re.gu-

Even within pro.grqms, budget · cuts: w..ere felt more

in promotional activity. The conservation

program'~

ha ve be e n r e d uc e d 50 per c e nt i n t he. pa s t t w:o yea r s..
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budget

proposal~

Mo s t of t he s e

cuts were made tn education and outreach programs

~htle

the

standards review and enforcement was reduced markedly less.

A

department structure can at least provide more attention and
preserve more resources in these areas than a plural body.

The

immediate and controversial demands of a regulatory body will
dominate the concern and attention of a plural body executing

•

both regulatory and promotional functions .
When the regulatory and administrative

responst~tlities

are

separated, the need for debate and an open forum is still provided for those issues which require such activity.

Under these

recommendations, the Commission would provide the forum for the
debate and weighing of issues and the Department would provide
the speed of action, coordination, and promotion necessary for
energy policy to be developed, defined, and implemented.

The

separation of these processes still provide for the four major
energy functions to be located in one agency, but it aligns the
regulatory and administrative responsibility in a more workable
structure.
A major question posed by the separation of these processes

is the ability of the policy developing agency to have any real
impact if the decision on policy in a specific case is made by
another body.

Can policy have any real impact when there is no

regulatory process

coupled with it to assure implementation?

The recommendations made here can provide for policy to have
an impact.

There are two policy-sensitive instruments which the
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Department will have a substantial role in developing and promoting before the Commission:
resource plan.

the electrical forecast and tha

The electrical forecast is sensitive to a number

of policy considerations, such as future growtn trends, conservation activities, and energy prices.

The resource plan is

based on the availability of alternative energy resources, costs,
and environmental impacts.

The Department exerts influence over

both these instruments through tne development of forecasts and
resource plans.

In addition, the Department will operate many

programs which influence both the adopted forecast and
plans.

t~e

resource

The Department•s activities in conservation, for example,

would be registered in the forecast and its success in alternative
energy development will affect the adopted resource plans.
There are also a number of policy and program initiatives
that can be taken by the Department which do not require regulatory approval.

The Governor established the

SolarC~].

Ceuncil

and Office to pursue his solar energy policy and to establish
a program with home builders.
approval.

This did not require any regulatory

Many programs in the conservation, alternatives

development, and energy analyses fields can be undertaken without
the need for regulatory activity.

Tne policy impact in these

areas can be facilitated by a department structure.

Programs can

be initiated and implemented with more speed and political backing.
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There are also areas in wh_ich
initiatives is needed.

q.

ch..eck u·pon the. policy and pr9gram

It is desirable for policy to have an

impact and to direct the state•s

r~sources,

but issues such as

environmental quality and rate structure need protection from
ill-conceived or incomplete policies.

Policy must not only be

implemented but it must also be sensitive to established policies
in other areas.

The use of coal for power plants, for example,

should be examined for its effect on air quality,
human health.

cast~,

There are questions which require the

and

di.~palsi.anate

and objective review of individuals whose task it is to weigh
facts and to hear all interested parties.

These decisions need

to be insulated from day-to-day political forces.
Re~ource

Planning

Resource planning refers to the process of preparing to
meet future electrical needs with appropriate resources.

This

requires that fuel type, capacity, plant type, and perhaps general
location of new facilities be defined early enough to plan, obtain
permits, purchase materials, and construct new facilities.

The

state•s role in this area is now limited to determining available
technologies, testing alternatives in the NOI, and reviewing
alternative supply proposals as part of rate applications.
The state•s role should be modified to require the Commission
to approve resource plans.

These approved plans would become part

of the Biennial Report and provide the policy and planning guidance
necessary to assist planning in the private sector.
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Agencies which

exercise authority influencing energy development (ARR, PUC,
SWRCB, Coastal Commission}

would be statutorily required to

coordinate their planning and permit activities with the resource
plan.

This coordination allows agencies to focus on a specific

product and should provide the early indication of
to plan effectively.

feasi . ~ility

needed

A utility would know, for example, if a

particular proposal was impossible because of limited air quality
or water availability before an application was ever filed.
Utilities would be required to submit resource plans every
year.

These plans would be made to correspond to the previously

adopted forecast and would be presented to the Commission for
approval.

The plans could also contain a number of reserve

facilities to meet contingencies, which may occur in the siting
process.

The Commission would provide the open forum for debate

and review at the public hearings.

Utilities, the Department of

Energy, interested groups and the public could present alternative :
proposals to the Commission to be included in the resource
The

Departm~nt

plan~.

wau·ld also be responsible for analyzing these plans.

The Commission would weigh proposals, against the criteria of cost,
feasibility, environmental impact, and other factors specified
in statute.

There would be a specified time for adoption of the

plans.
Once adopted, these resource plans would serve as the
guidelines for the submission of applications for siting approval.
A utility which submits an application for a facility contained
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in the plans would move through a more expeditious siting
process.

M~ny

of the generic issues involved in siting

such facilities could be completed in the Department of Energy's
analyses making an expeditious siting process feasible.

A

utility, however, would be free to pursue a proposal not contained
in the plan, but an increased burden of proof would be placed upon
the applicant and a more

leng~hy

siting process would be required.

The Department of Energy's role in this process is to review
and critique the resource plans and provide its analysis to the
Commission.

The Department would be required to conduct generic

studies on various fuels and plant types to provide the state's
early planning in this area.

The Department could also propose

its own resource plan to the Commission.
Resource planning, much like demand forecasting, is an interactive process requiring substantial information from state
agencies and the utilities.

It has taken time to produce a sound

electrical demand forecast which covers all sectors and more work
still needs to be done.

It should not be expected that the state

will be capable of performing immediately all the tasks necessary
for developing a workable resource plan.

If the state assumes

increased responsibility in this area, it would be understood that
it will take time and some additional resources to perform this
function well.
The state is presently exercising some of the responsibilities
required for resource planning.

The various costs, environmental

impacts, technical feasibility, and general location for electrical
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facilities are currently reviewed and analyzed by the Commission.
Some of these reviews occur in the determination of available
technologies included in the Biennial Report.

Other reviews

occur during the NOI where alternative proposals are tested
against utility applications.

The difficulty with the present

structure is its propensity to analyze these issues in the
latter part of the regulatory process.

The NOI is not the

appropriate stage of the siting process to consider alternatives.
Given the time and money expended by utilities and others on the
proposal, and the lead time necessary for many facilities,
alternatives would be difficult to implement at this stage.

An

earlier analysis of alternatives is necessary.
Resource planning is one of the few ways to provide any real
degree of certainty and coordination of state energy activities.
Resource planning focuses the efforts of state agencies and
compels them to provide an early indication of feasibility, cost,
and environmental impact.

This will not provide a guarantee,

but it will give early warning and indication of the likelihood
that a proposed facility can be constructed.

Resource planning is also a more certain way for the state
to influence utility activity in the area of alternatives
development.

Presently, the tools available for the state to

encourage and develop alternative resources are research,
regulation, and financial incentives through the tax system.
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Utilities spend far more money on research than the state.

The

state has provided financial incentives for some alternative
sources and has used regulation tnrough the siting process to
encourage the use of certain fuels and plant types.

The state

has not used the planning process to influence alternative
resources.

Resource planning would allow the state to have an

influence over utility planning and expenditures of funds for
alternatives.

It can give the state an increased ability to

encourage alternative resources hy offering a positive incentive
for alternatives development.
This resource planning activity will not replicate the work
of utilities nor is it a state-imposed plan developed by an
unresponsive bureaucracy.
interactive process between

This recommendation would require an
u~ilities,

the state, and the public.

Planning activities would be known early with time to consider
alternativ~

proposals.

A true dialogue could be opened between

the three groups, which would still allow for utilities to
exercise their own discretion and provide for

~tate

policy

influence over the use of public resources.
Common Timetable
One of the essential findings of this report is that the
planning and regulatory process is confused, uncoordinated, and
fragmented.

Creating a department structure and providing for

a resource plan will assist in reducing the confusion and provide
for increased coordination.

More is needed, however, to assure
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that

t~e

various energy-related agencies coordinate both their

regulatory and planning activities.

To provide

t~ts

assurance,

a common timetable should be placed into statute which requires
these planning activities to he coordinated according to specific
deadlines.

The Commission's

aut~ority

to override the energy

decisions of other state and local agencies in siting cases should ·
be affirmed by statute.
Each of the major energy agencies lthe ARB,

t~e

PUC, the

SWRCB, and the Coastal Commission} should be required by statute
to comment and make findings of initial feasibility of
resource plans and any power plant siting cases.

t~e

These agencies

should be required to provide this analysis in the Biennial
Report and the NOI on a time certain basis.

Each agency will be

required to provide, where appropriate, estimates of environmental
impact and potential mitigation,

likeli~ood

of meeting any appli-

cable federal and state standards, costs of control measures, and
the financial requirements needed for the proposed projects.
The recent ARB-Energy Commission agreement is a good
illustration of the manner in which the regulatory process should
be coordinated.

This agreement specifies the time at which the

ARB will make initial determinations in the Energy Commission's
regulatory process.

The agreement also indicates the authority

of each of the agencies (ARB, Commission, and local districts}
and makes clear the extent to which local districts can go in
enforcing state standards.

The agreement, however, is only

enforceable as long as the two agencies agree on its elements.
To clarify its enforceability and ensure its legal standing,
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this type of agreement should be placed in the law.

In addition,

the agreement only involves the ARB and Commission relationship
in the regulatory process and does not address planning activities
where the need for an early indication of feasibility is needed.
The other major agencies, such as the PUC, SWQCB, and Coastal
Commission, should be included in similar arrangements.

The PUC,

for example, should provide a preliminary indication of the
financial feasibility of the projects contained in the resource
plan and the impact on the rate base of the various alternatives.
This can provide the department and Commission with early
indication of the feasibility of various proposals and will enable
the resource plan to be adopted with some reasonable level of
certainty that the project can be financed.

An increased level

of analysis should be provided at the NOI stage, where the
specific proposal in the resource plan takes on a site-specific
nature.

Thus, the level of comment from other agencies should

be increased so that barring substantial errors or changes in
federal or state requirements by law, the project should receive
a preliminary "go" or "no go" determination.
By focusing the attention of the various state agencies on
a central document, requiring

t~eir

participation by statute,

making a line agency the coordinating vehicle with responsibility
to the Governor, and initiating the process early, the state can
provide for the coordination and certainty necessary for sound
planning of future energy needs.

The requirement makes binding

what now rests on agency discretion.
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Surcharge
The Commission is presently funded ny a surcharge of up to
0.2 mills per kilowatt hour of electricity sold in the state.
The surcharge was intended to have the users of electrical energy
pay the cost of planning, regulation, and alternative activities.
As an individual •s electrical use increases, his or her support
for the state•s electrical energy activities increases.
The surcharge has proved to be an excellent revenue source
directly related to the state•s energy responsibilities and should
be retained to fund both the Commission and the Department of
Energy.

The budgets of both agencies should be presented to the

legislature.

Any disputes or conflicts should be resolved by the

Department of Finance or the Secretary of Resources.

26

FOOTNOTES
1
It should be noted, however, that neither of these offices
was examined in detail during the course of this study.
2
commission on California State Government Organization and
Economy, The Use of Boards and Commissions in the Resources
Agency, April 1965, p. 8.

•

3california, Joint Legis.lati.ve. Audi.t Commi.tte.e., lmproveroe.nts.
Needed in Planning and Monitoring Re.searc~ and Development of
Alternative Energy Resources, November 28, 1978, and California,
Legislative Analyst, Supplemental Analysts, Item 173, Energy
Resources Conservation and Development Commission, Research and
Development Contracts, p. 1.
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HISTORY OF THE WARREN-ALQUIST ACT
In the early 1960's, the state's utility companies took the
lead role in planning for new supplies of electricity.

Although

the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) had legal authority to certify new power facilities, the PUC's decision process
did not seriously challenge the utilities' choice of power plant
designs or sites.

Oil and natural gas, which were then the

primary boiler fuels, were inexpensive and in plentiful supply.
Nuclear power was in the early stages of commercialization, but
it looked promising.

In general, the early 1960's was an era of

optimism concerning the state's energy future.
During the late 1960's, growing public awareness of the
diminishing quality and quantity of natural resources led federal,
state and local governments to play a larger role in reviewing
any project which was likely to have adverse environmental effects.
Not suprisingly, the process of gaining approval for power plants
became more difficult.

By 1970, nearly 30 federal, state and

local permits were necessary before a utility could construct a
power plant.l

Utilities began to express concern about delays in

the power plant siting process and possible power shortages.
In the early 1970's, the Legislature made several attempts
to bring order into the power plant siting process; most of the
energy-related legislation introduced between 1972 and 1974 dealt
with power plant siting.2

In gen~ral, this legislation sought to

create boards or commissions with exclusive authority to site new
electrical facilities.
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Three reports were published during this period which influenced the Legislature•s approach to energy planning:
1)

2)

Meeting California's Energy Requirements, 1975-2000,
which the state•s five largest utilities commasstoned
from the Stanford Research Institute in 1973.

3)

State Power Plant Siting: A Sketch of the Main Features
of a Possible Aperoach, by California Institute of
Technology 1 s Env1ronmen~al Quality Laboratory, which was
also published in 1973.
This report wa~ transmitted
to the Assembly as Memorandum No. 4. These reports are
summarized below.

The Rand Report
The Rand report consists of three volumes.

Volume One deals

with forecasting future demand for electricity; it suggests a
methodology for developing such forecasts.
power plant siting.

Volume Two discusses

Volume Three deals with slowing the growth

rate in demand for electricity.
The Rand report states that fragmented authority in what was
then the state's regulatory framework for electrical facilities
hindered the state's ability to deal
process.

~ith

-.

delays in the siting

According to the Rand report, many issues were "fall[ing]

between the cracks''.6

The report states that "no one has adequate

•

responsibility for:
Comprehensive statewide land use planning and standards to
ensure that a proposed power plant would be compatible with
its surroundings ;
Clear and consistent guidelines for utilities to follow in
long-range planning.
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Identification of, and planning for, ~ower systems and sites
alternative to those proposed by utillties.
Overall allocation and conservation of natural resources,
such as fuel and water.
Means for conserving, and reducing demand for, electricity
and other energy resources.
Priorities to use in resolving conflicting needs and values.

•

Research and development of new technologies and better
methods of selecting sites for power plants .
An organized method of presenting Californta•s needs and
priorities to federal agencies and of attempting to influence
federal research and development policies and actions to
meet California•s needs."7
The report suggests that the state should establish an institutional framework for planning future energy facilities and
assuring that needed facilities are constructed in time to meet
increasing demand.

The main elements of this framework are:

1}

An ••open planning" process involving the public and the
state early in utilities• plans to construct new
facilities.

2}

A power plant siting agency which consolidates previously
fragmented authority over land use, environmental
quality, and energy policy.

3)

An independent forecasting capability in either the
siting agency or a line agency.

4}

Policies for reducing energy demand.a

Within this framework, a utility would inform state authorities early its planning process of the kinds of facilities (i.e.,
fuel type, size) it intended to build and the general location of
the facilities.

The public would have access to this information

and would have an opportunity to participate in the planning
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process.

The siting agency would develop a forecast of future

demand for electricity and would determine the legitimate need
for new facilities according to the forecast.

The siting author-

ity would then review sites where the utility could construct
needed facilities.

The state's role in reducing energy demand

would be to promote conservation measures, such as home insulation,
more efficient home appliances, and educational programs.

The

report argues that such conservation measures would reduce the
need for additional electrical facilities and, consequently,
would reduce the adverse environmental effects associated wtth
energy facilities.

The Rand report states, however, that "even

if such {conservation] policies {are] successful .•. it is estimated
that the growth in demand for electricity {even at a growth rate
of 3% per year] will still be significant and many new power
facilities will be required in the next 30 years." 9
The Rand report is significant not only because it influenced
the Legislature's actions, but also because it recommended that
the state become involved in areas where state government previously maintained no authority.

For example, the state had no

role in conserving energy, in planning for future energy facilities, and in providing public access to utilities• plans early
in the planning process.

The state•s regulatory authority over

energy matters was confined at that time primarily to health and
safety issues.
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The Stanford Research Institute Report
After the Rand report was published, the state's five largest
utilitieslO contracted with Stanford Research Institute (SRI) to
study California's future energy needs and the problems which the
state faced until the year 2000.

The SRI report, issued in

May 1973, differs from the Rand report.

SRI concludes that a

nationwide energy shortage will . occur in the future, but the
shortage will be less severe in California.

The report argues

that energy prices will continue to rise, but that electricity
prices are non-elastic; that is, demand for electricity will not
decline substantially as prices rise.

The report discounts the

contribution that alternative energy resources, such as solar and
geothermal energy, can make to the state•s energy supply in this
century, and states that the state will continue to rely on oil,
gas, hydro-electrtcity, and nuclear power for its
production.

f~ture

Finally, the report argues against the

electric

sta~e•s

requiring energy conservation because it would have a negative
effect on the state•s economy.
It is obvious that the two reports, Rand and SRI, differ in
their approach to solving California energy problems.

Basically,

Rand argues for a systematic state involvement in energy planning
and regulation, while SRI argues for state involvement to extend
only in the power plant licensing process and in simplifying the
regulatory maze that federal, state, and local government regulations created.

Both reports indicate that division of state
32

authority and requirements for numerous permits before new power
facilities can be constructed cause delay and indecision in the
regulatory process.
Environmental Quality Lab
Early in 1973, the Assembly Subcommittee on Electrical Energy
Policy held several days of hearings on electrical power and how
it should be planned and regulated.

The Environmental Quality

Laboratory (EQL) Memorandum No. 4 was presented at these hearings.
This document outlines the features of a siting process; it substantially influenced the drafting of the Warren-Alquist Act.
The major features of this memorandum are summarized below.
Siting Council -The memorandum calls for a siting council,
composed exclusively of public members, "which should have
the sole authority and responsibility to select and certify,
from among alternatives, the sites and conditions for
nuclear and fossil-fueled power plants".

The council is
to be the "one-stop" siting agency for the state. 1 1
Alternative Sites - EQL argues for a planning process that
gives early attention to "alternative sites, designs, fuels,
transmission corridors, etc."12

The recommendation is for

the siting process to provide five alternative sites, which
would later be narrowed to three.

This procedure would

create an inventory of acceptable sites for later use.
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One-Stop Authority and Preemption - "A rational siting
program must, we believe, abandon the pattern of fragmented
authority that characterizes the present siting process.
Fragmented authority has produced unnecessary delay, confusion, parochialism, inconsistency, and buck-passing.

We

believe that in the interest of efficient and thorough
planning, the siting council should (a} operate on a onestop basis and (b) should preempt local jurisdiction over
the environmental issues related to siting.nl3
Open Planning- EQL called on utilities to identify their
supply proposals early in the planning stages, and urged
early public access and full participation in the decisionmaking process.

This process was seen as a "cooperative

venture rather than an adversary contest in which each side
tries in a public hearing to convince a third party of the
correctness of its viewsn.l4

The open planning concept has

received considerable attention since the EQL memorandum;
the Energy Commission•s Notice of Intention (NOI) procedures
is an attempt to initiate open planning.

EQL defined open

planning in the following manner:
Open planning would begin at the outset of the
decision process--at the time, that is, when a
utility initiates its own inquiries about the
need for new capacity, its location, design, and
operation. Utilities would be required to
announce the beginning of their inquiries and
to invite meetings with any concerned groups and
individuals, both public and private. They would
also be required to actively seek out such groups
and individuals and to solicit their views.I5
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EQL's memorandum sets the stage for both the informal NOI
process and the concept of a Public Advisor, whose duty it is
to seek out and to assist the public before the Commission.
The Commission's current

siti~g

the process EQL describes.
the question:

process differs, however, from

The most critical difference concerns

When does the open planning process start?

Following the publication of the Rand report and additional
hearings in the Assembly, most energy legislation sought to
increase the state's role in energy

p1~nni~g

by placing in one

state institution the authority for forecasting, conservation,
and research, as well as siting.

This combination of regulatory

and promotional functions was contained in SB 283 (Alquist),
introduced in the 1973 Session.

The bill was passed by both

Houses but was vetoed by Governor Reagan.

In May 1974, following

the Arab oil embargo, an almost identical bill, the Warren-Alquist
Act (AB 1575 - Warren), was passed by the Legislature and was
signed into law by Governor Reagan.
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14 Ibid., p 7.
15 Ibid., p 8.
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STATE ENERGY FUNCTIONS
THE ENERGY COMMISSION
The Warren-Alquist Act gave the Commission responsibility
for four energy functions:

forecasting and planning for future

energy demand; energy conservation; power plant siting; and
research and development of energy sources of unique benefit to

•

the state.

Each of these functions is examined below.

Planning and Forecasttng ·
The Commission carried out its planning function by preparing
every two years

a report to the Governor and the Legislature

which expresses the state's energy policy.

Public Resources Code

Section 25309 states the general nature of the Biennial Report:
" ..• a comprehensive report designed to identify
emerging trends related to energy supply, demand,
and conservation and public health and safety factors,
to specify the level of statewide and service area
electrical energy demand for each year in the coming
5-, 12-, and 20-year periods, and to provide the
basis for state policy and actions in relations,
thereto, including, but not limited to, approval
of new sites for additional facilities."
The purposes which the Biennial Report serves are:
To determine and establish the goals that must be met
in order to satisfy the electrical energy needs of the
state.
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To identify and evaluate the variety of opportunities
available in the state for satisfying its electrical
energy needs.
To identify and evaluate the relative costs and benefits,
impacts, and risks of alternative ways of meeting the
state•s electrical energy needs.
To set forth the policies which will guide the
Commission in accomplishing the goals that are
established.
To set forth the knowledge findings, criteria and
tests which will be used by the Commission in making
decisions on specific electrical energy proposals. 1
Thus, the Biennial Report is the state•s central planning document
for energy demand and supply.
One of the main features of the Biennial Report is the forecast of demand for electricity.

The Warren-Alquist Act requires

the state•s electrical utilities to submit to the Commission
every two years reports specifying 5-, 12-, and 20-year forecasts
of demands and resources in their respective service areas.

The

Commission must establish a common forecasting methodology for
utilities to use in preparing these reports.

Utilities are allowed,

however, to include in the reports additional forecasts based on
their own methodologies.

The Commission must evaluate the
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utilities• forecasts, taking into consideration the Public
Utilities Commission's comments; the Department of Finance's
population growth estimates; statewide and regional land use,
transportation, and economic development programs; critical
environmental issues; public health and safety; and the effect
on electricity rates of new facilities.2

•

The Commission also

must identify reasonable alternatives to the electricitygenerating technologies which utilities propose.
The Commission must publish preliminary and final reports
containing its findings and conclusions on the utilities• forecasts.
These reports precede the Biennial Report.

The Commission must

hold hearings prior to issuing the final report.

The reports are

based on the Commission's independent analysis and public comments
on the utilities• forecasts.

The contents of the reports, which

are generally reiterated in the Biennial Report, include:
1)

The Commission's evaluation of the environmental,
economic, health, and safety issues associated with
constructing and operating the facilities which the
utilities propose.

2)

Alternative technologies which the Commission identifies
as reasonable.

3)

The Commission's determination of anticipated demand for
energy on a 5-, and 12-year basis. This determination
of demand, which includes all reasonable conservation
efforts, is used as a basis for certifying new facilities.
The Commission's determination of 20-year demand is used
as a basis for recommending energy conservation activities.

4)

A statement of what new facilities are needed statewide
and in each service area.

5)

An analysis of m3thods to reduce the growth in demand
for electricity.
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When the Commission began its operation in 1975, it did not
have sufficient staff or data to generate an independent forecast.
The Commission adopted as its first forecast the same forecast
which the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) developed pursuant to
its General Order 131.

The current forecast, which the Commission

adopted in 1977, anticipates a growth rate of 3.8% per year over
the next 10 years.

This growth rate calls for an additional

23,700 MW of electrical capacity by 1990.

The Commission's next

forecast, which is due in the spring of 1979, is expected to show
a lower growth rate for the next 12 years.
Chapter 1013, Statutes of 1978 (SB 1859, Alquist), made two
important changes in the Commission's planning and forecasting
mandates.

First, the Commission's demand forecast is now the

primary forum for determining all conservation, load management,
and other demand-reducing measures which can reasonably be expected
to occur.

Second, the Commission must hold ••generic" proceedings

(Section 25309) to determine the commercial availability of
alternative generating and nongenerating technologies (e.g., load
management, fuel cells).

The first change specifies, in effect,

that conservation issues are to be considered only in the
Commission's forecast and not in individual siting cases.

The

second change allows the Commission, with respect to generating
technologies, to "define the threshold evidentiary burden for any
person proposing a technology in a siting case".4

That is, the

generic proceedings allow the Commission to determine how much
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and what kinds of information are necessary in order to offer a
particular alternative as a challenge to whatever technology a
utility proposes in a siting case.

For example, if the generic

proceedings were to indicate tnat fuel cells are commercially
available, it would then be possible to perform a comparative
environmental, financial, and technical analysis of fuel cells

•

versus the utility's proposal in a siting case.

Both of tbese

changes are intended to expedite the siting process.
One issue which the Commission's planning mandates leave
unresolved is the extent to which the Commission should be
involved in resource planning.

Resource planning can be defined as

determining the location, fuel type, capacity, and chronology of
new generating facilities.

Although Chapter 1013, Statutes of

1978, prohibits the Commission from mandating a specific supply
plan for any utility, the same legislation requires the Commission
to include in the Biennial Report some elements of a supply plan:
a statement of probable capacity additions on a service area
basis; the availability of power from cogeneration and purchased
power; a determination of the commercial availability of
generating technologies; and an indication of those technologies
which merit additional research and development.
Conservation
The Warren-Alquist Act requires the Commission to conduct a
general assessment of energy conservation opportunities in the
state.

The general assessment includes continuous studies on:
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1}

Pricing of energy.

2}

Improving building design and insulation.

3}

Restricting promotional activities to increase
electricity use.

4}

Improving the efficiency of home appliances.

5}

Improving power generating and transmitting facilities.

6}

Compgring efficiencies in alternative methods of energy
use.

The Commission is required to include its recommendations on
conservation in the Biennial Report.
The Commission is also required to implement conservation
measures through regulations.

Specifically, the Commission is

required to:
1}

Adopt 11 prescriptive 11 building standards for lighting,
insulation, and climate control. These standards
require buildings to have, for example, insulation of
a particular rating (e.g., R-19}, or a heating and air
conditioning system with a specific rating in Btu•s/hour.

2}

Adopt 11 performance 11 standards for residential and nonresidential buildings. These standards specify allowable
energy consumption per square foot of floor space.

3}

Adopt efficiency standards for those appliances which
consume a 11 significant amount of energy on a statewide
basis 11 (Section 25402c}. The Commission has adopted
standards for air conditioners, refrigerators, freezers,
water heaters, space heaters, and plumbing fixtures.

4}

Adopt standards to guide utilities• load management
efforts.

5}

Recommend standards for power plant efficiency. 6

The standards relating to building design and construction must
be no more costly th,an

11

historical 11 construction tech.ntq.ue.s, would be
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when compared over the economic life of the building.

The

appliance efficiency standards must be technically feasible and
must not increase consumers' costs over the life of the appliance.
The load management standards must be technically feasible and
no more costly than new electrical capacity.
The building and appliance industries have initiated legal
challenges to the Commission's standards,? and have charged
that the Commission's authority to issue such standards is openended; that is, the Commission has substantial discretion over
what devices will be subject to standards.
The Commission's conservation efforts affect the Commission's
planning, forecasting, and siting activities.

The previous

section discusses the recent changes to the Warren-Alquist Act
which specify that the forecast is assumed to include all reasonable
conservation measures.

These changes also specify that the need

for new power plants is determined on the basis of the 5- and
12-year forecasts.

The success of the Commission's conservation

efforts may, therefore, influence the need for new facilities.
The Public Utilities Commission (PUC), the Department of
Housing and Community Development (HCD), and local governments
all have a role in implementing conservation measures.

The PUC's

activities overlap the Commission's in certain areas and,
therefore, are discussed in the section on the Commission's
relationship with other agencies.

Prior to the Warren-Alquist

Act, HCD had responsibility for building efficiency standards.
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HCD continues its involvement in this area through contracts with
the Commission.

Local governments enforce the Commission's

standards and may also develop their own conservation mandates.
Power Plant Siting
The Commission's power plant siting process is contained in
Public Resources Code Sections 25500 through 25542.

The

Commission's authority to certify electricity-generating facilities applies to thermal power plants with a capacity of at
least 50 MW and to the appurtenant facilities.
The siting process is divided into two stages:

(1) the

Notice of Intention (NOI), which lasts 12 months, and

(2} the

Application for Certification (AFC), which generally lasts 18
months.

For geothermal facilities and some alternative techno-

logies, the entire process lasts from 9 to 12 months.
stages are described below.

The two

These cases are adjudicated by

a committee of the Commission comprised of a presiding member
and one additional Commissioner.
The Notice of Intention
A utility proposing to build a power plant or an electric
transmission line must submit a NOI to the Commission.

The pur-

pose of the NOI is to allow the Commission to make a preliminary
determination of whether the proposed site for the facility is
suitable and whether the proposed facility is needed according to
the Commission's adopted demand forecasts.
The NOI must contain at least three alternative sites. At
least one site must be located outside the coastal zone. The NOI
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must also contain a description of the proposed sites; a summary
of the design criteria of the facilities; the types of fuel to be
used; a preliminary statement of the relative economic, technological, and environmental advantages of the facilities at each
site; and a statement of the need for the facility based on the
Commission•s most recent Biennial Report. 8
If the Commission staff determines that the NOI is incomplete
as filed, the NOI is returned to the applicant with a statement
of its deficiencies.
When the Commission accepts a NOI, the

11

clock starts

12-month time requirement for a NOI decision.

11

on the

The Commission

published a summary of the NOI in a newspaper in each county where
the proposed sites are located.

The Public Utilities Commission

and other state, local, and federal agencies having an interest
in the proposed facilities also receive a · copy of the NOI.
Chapter 1013, Statutes of 1978 (SB 1859, Alquist) divided
the NOI hearings into two phases.

During the first phase, which

lasts six months, the Commission holds:

(1) public informational

presentations in the counties in which the proposed facilities
are located; and (2) nonadjudicatory hearings.
The informational presentations provide

knowledge and an
understanding of the proposed facilities and sites ... 9 The non11

adjudicatory hearings provide the public and government agencies
an opportunity to participate

in an informal setting without

concern about strict legal requirements and cross-examination.
They also provide for general comments
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from concerned

parties about the environmental, public health, safety, economic,
social, and land use effects of the proposed facilities, as well
as information about alternative sources of electrical generating
capacity.
Following the nonadjudicatory hearings, the Commission must
prepare a

11

Summary and hearing order 11 which:

1)

Identifies issues for consideration in the second phase
of the NOI (i.e., adjudicatory hearings).

2)

Identifies issues which may be eliminated from further
consideration during the NOI.

3)

Identifies issues which should be deferred until the
AFC stage.

4)

Makes proposed findings on matters relevant to the
Commission•s final report on the NOI.10

The second six-month phase of the NOI begins with adjudicatory
hearings.

These hearings provide a record upon which the

Commission can base its NOI decisions.

Following the adjudicatory

hearings, the Commission must issue its final report on the NOI.
The final report must contain:
1)

The Commission•s findings and conclusions regarding the
conformity of the proposed sites with the 12-year forecast in the Biennial Report and with applicable local,
state, and federal laws, including state and regional
long-range land use plans.

2)

Findings of the Coastal Commission and BCDC.

3)

The Commission•s findings on the acceptability and
relative merit of each proposed site.

4)

The Commission•s findings and conclusions on the safety
and reliability of the facilities at each site.ll

The Commission must hold hearings on the final report.
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The Commission may not approve the NOI unless the final
report shows that two proposed sites are acceptable, unless

t~e

applicant has made a good faith effort to find alternative sites
and only one site is acceptable.

The Commission's written

decision on the NOI is due no later than 12 months after the NOI
is accepted.
NOI's are not required for some power plants.

These

include:
1)

Geothermal power plants which can provide "commercial
quantities" of geothermal resources.

2)

Thermal cogeneration facilities up to 300 MW.

3)

Thermal power plants feasible only at the energy source.

4)

Modifications of existing facilities.

5)

New thermal power plant technologies up to 300 MW.

6)

Any thermal power plant up to 100 MW. 12

Application for Certification
Although the Commission has received and processed several
NOI's, only one proposed power plant has proceeded to the AFC
stage. 13 The AFC process, therefore, is not as well defined as
the NOI process.
In general, the technical details of a proposed power plant
and related facilities are considered during the AFC stage.

The

AFC must contain a detailed description of the design, construction, and operation of the proposed facility, including safety
and reliability information; site maps containing geologic,
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environmental, and demographic data; a statement of need for the
facility, generating capacity, plant life and fuel costs; and a
description of cost and routes of transmission lines associated
with the facility.l4
When the Commission receives an AFC, it must initiate the
process of complying with the California Environmental Quality
Act (CEQA).

The Commission acts as the lead agency responsible

for the preparation of an environmental impact report (EIR) under
CEQA.

The EIR must be completed within one year after the AFC is

received.
Within 90 to 240 days (i.e., three to eight months) after
the AFC is filed, the Commission must begin public hearings in
either Sacramento, San Francisco, Los Angeles, or San Diego, whichever is nearest to the proposed site.

Additional hearings may

be held in the county in which the proposed facility is located.
Within 18 months after the AFC is filed, the Commission must issue
a written decision on the AFC.
In the written AFC decision, the Commission must include:
1)

Provisions stating how the design, siting and operation
of the proposed facility protect the environment and
assure public health and safety.

2)

Provisions, where applicable, to meet the requirements
which the Coastal Commission and BCDC may specify.

3)

The facilities• conformance with all applicable construction standards and applicable state, federal and local
laws.

4)

Provisions for restoring the site for environmental purposes if the AFC is denied.

48

5)

Conformity of the facilities with the 12-year forecast
in the Biennial Report.l5

The Commission is prohibited from certifying any facilities
which:
1)

Add generating capacity to a multifacility site in excess of the maximum allowable capacity as specified
in the NOI.

2)

Conflict with state or local laws or standards {e.g.,
state air quality standards) unless certification is
required for the public convenience and necessity.

3)

The Coastal Commission or BCDC designate as
pursuant to their respective mandates.

4)

Are in specified environmentally sensitive areas.

5)

Nuclear power plants, under specified conditions.

I

un~uttahle

The Commission's decision on any AFC is subject to judicial review.
For geothermal power plants, the time requirement for an AFC
decision is 12 months.

As stated previously, NOI's are not

necessary for all geothermal facilities.

If a NOI is filed and

approved, however, the AFC decision time is shortened to nine
months.

Three alternative sites are not required in either a

NOI or an AFC for geothermal facilities.
The Commission may also approve county programs for certifying
geothermal facilities.

Once approved, county programs supersede

all of the Commission's procedures for certifying geothermal
facilities.

The Commission may revoke its approval of a county's

program under specified conditions, however.
In both the NOI and AFC stages, the Commission has the
to review,with comments from the PUC, the relative economic,
financial, and rate impacts of a proposed facility!
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aut~ority

Research and Development
The Commission's mandates for research and development are ·
intended to develop

alternative

energy resources and to reduce

the state's dependence on any one particular energy resource.
The Commission's basic mandate is to develop and coordinate a
research and development program in "energy supply, consumption,
conservation, and the technology of siting. 16

The Commission

is required to carry out technical assessment studies on "all
forms of energy and energy-related problems, in order to influence federal research and development priorities and to be informed on future energy options and their impacts." 17 The Commission is specifically required to do technical assessments of
alternative energy sources, such as solar and geothermal, advanced nuclear power concepts, coastal and offshore siting, the
use of waste water for power plant cooling, modes of transportation, recycling of materials, the use of waste heat, and the use
of agricultural products and municipal waste as energy sources.
The Commission must submit each year for the Governor's budget
an ''integrated program of proposed research and development". 18
The Commission's research and development efforts have concentrated on renewable energy resources.

For example, the Com-

mission has developed standards and testing criteria for solar
energy systems.

Solar systems must meet these criteria in order

to qualify for the state's 55% solar energy tax credit.

The

Commission will also publish a design manual for builders wishing
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to use solar devices in new construction.

Recent legislation

(Chapter 1367, Statutes of 1978) requires the Commission to conduct a statewide design competition to select outstanding examples
of residential buildings using passive solar architecture.
Recent legislation also expanded the Commission's role in
promoting wind energy and simplified the Commission's siting
process for geothermal, cogeneration, and experimental thermal
power plant designs.l9
Amendments to the Warren-Alguist Act
The Legislature has amended the Warren-Alquist Act since
1975 to correct problems which arose during the application of
the Act's mandates (e.g., power plant siting delays) and to clarify the state's policy regarding energy supply and conservation
options.

The most important modifications are discussed below.

The Legislature passed three laws in 1975 (Public Resources
Code, Sections 25524.1, 25524.2 and 25524.3) which discourage,
for the time being, the development of nuclear power in California.
These laws specifically prohibit the Commission from certifying
nuclear power plants unless the federal

governme~t

has identi-

fied, and there exists, technologies for (1) (Section 25524.1)
reprocessing nuclear fuel rods (this law applies to nuclear
plants which are designed to use reprocessed fuel), and (2)
(Section 25524.2) disposing of high-level nuclear waste.

Sec-

tion 25524.3 requires the Commission to study the feasibility of
placing nuclear power plants underground for safety reasons and
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prohibits

the Commission from certifying nuclear plants until

the study

is completed.

July 1978.

The Commission completed the study in

The Commission concluded that design features which

are cheaper than undergrounding are equally effective for insuring safety.20
Chapter 1013, Statutes of 1978 (SB 1859-Alquist), contains
the most significant changes which have been made to the
Warren-Alquist Act.

This legislation implements regulatory

reforms which both the Commission and the utility companies
found necessary. Specifically, Chapter 1013:
1)

Shortened the Notice of Intention stage of power
plant siting from 18 to 12 months and divided the
NOI into two phases: informational presentations and
nonadjudicatory hearings; and adjudicatory hearings.

2)

Eliminated the requirement that the Commission must
determine the "accuracy and acceptability'' of utility
forecasts. The Commission still assesses the utility
forecasts and adopts its own forecast.

3)

Changed the content of the Biennial Report to make the
Report the state's central working document for energy
supply and demand issues. The forecast, which is in the
Biennial Report, is now assumed to include all reasonable
conservation measures available. The Report also contains the Commission's assessment of alternative technologies. This assessment helps the Commission to focus
in the NOI on those alternatives which are commercially
available.

Chapter 1010, Statutes of 1978 (SB 1805-Joint Committee on
the State's Economy) allows utilities to bypass the NOI process
for the following technologies:

cogeneration facilities up to

300 MW; modifications to existing facilities; thermal power
plants feasible only at the energy source; thermal power plants
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less than 100 MW; new thermal power plant technologies up to
300 MW.
Chapter 1271, Statutes of 1978 (AB 2644-Goggin) changes the
siting process for geothermal facilities.

Primarily, this

chapter shortens the Application for Certification process from
18 to 12 months for geothermal facilities, and makes the NOI
optional in certain cases.

This chapter also allows the

Commission to certify county geothermal development programs which
supplement the Commission•s siting procedures for geothermal
facilities.
RELATIONS WITH OTHER AGENCIES
Although the Warren-Alquist Act intended to make the Commission
the single regulatory agency for energy issues, other state
agencies maintain energy-related regulatory functions.

In

general, these agencies are ••single purpose" agencies (e.g., the
Air Resources Board) whose authority to issue permits affects
the power plant siting process.

This section on the Commission•s

relations with other agencies discusses the general powers of
these agencies and areas where their authority conflicts with
the Commission•s authority.
Energy-Related Functions of the Air Resources Board
General Authority
Air quality regulation in California is divided between the
Air Resources Board (ARB) and local Air Pollution Control
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D

Districts (APCD).

The ARB has authority to divide the state

into air basins (Health and Safety Code Section 39606a) and to
adopt ambient air quality standards for each basin (Section
39606b).

The ARB is also the air pollution control agency for

all purposes set forth in federal law (Section 39602).

The

APCD's must achieve and maintain state and federal air quality
standards (Section 40001).

In general, the ARB may assume the

authority of an APCD if the APCD is not performing its duties
adequately (Section 41505).

The ARB also provides assistance

to APCD's which do not have sufficient staff and financial
resources.
Specific Procedures
The ARB exercises influence over the power plant siting
process through its authority to prepare the State Implementation
Plan (SIP) for meeting federal ambient air quality standards
(Section 39602).

The SIP contains New Source Review (NSR) rules

which APCD's use in deciding whether to issue permits for new
air pollution sources.

The federal Clean Air Act of 1970

required states to prepare SIP's.

California currently has a

SIP, a part of which was prepared by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA)

which must approve SIP's.

In 1977,

amendments to the Clean Air Act required states to revise their
SIP's.

The ARB must submit the revised SIP to the EPA in

January 1979.

Federal law requires that

Califo~nia,

through

its SIP, meet all federal ambient air quality standards by 1982,
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with a possible extension until 1987 for oxidant and carbon
monoxide pollutants.
The APCD's influence over power plant siting is exercised
through the issuance of "Authority to Construct" permits.
According to the ARB, it is currently illegal to construct a
thermal power plant in California without obtaining a permit
from the local APCo. 21 NSR rules, which the APCD's use in permit
decisions, may vary between APCD's, but all NSR rules are subject
to ARB approval.

The NSR rules specify that:

(1}

new

stationary pollution sources must use the Best Available Control
Technology (BACT), and (2)

new sources may not contribute to

violations of either federal or state22 ambient air quality
standards or to violations of the federal Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD} increments in certain sensitive areas.
(These areas are designated Class I, II, or III; Class I areas
are the most sensitive, e.g., national parks.)
In cases where a new source would violate state or federal
ambient air quality standards, the NSR rules allow the APCD's
to approve the source if the apptacant of.fers emissions
trade-offs; that is, the source proponent must take responsibility
for decreasing air pollutants from existing sources in the area
so that air quality, incl.uding emissions from the new source,
improves.

In some cases, interdistrict trade-offs are allowed.
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Conflicts Between the ARB/APCD's and the
Conservation and Deve o ment Comm1ssion
Jurisdictional Issues
The ARB/APCD authority to issue permits for power plants has
not meshed well in the past with the Commission's power plant
siting process.

No mechanism existed for coordinating the time

requirements of the ARB/APCD permit process with the Commission's
36-month certification process.2 3 The ARB and the Commission,
however, have drafted an agreement specifying each agency's role
in the siting process (see Section 4, p. 60).

The following

discussion provides background on the jurisdictional conflicts
which led to the agreement.
The Warren-Alquist Act gives the Commission the "exclusive
authority to certify all [power plant] sites and related
facilities in the state".

Section 25500 also states that a

Commission power plant certificate is ''in lieu of any permit ... "
required by any other state agency "to the extent permitted
under federal law".

The Commission committee reviewing Pacific

Gas and Electric's (PG&E) proposed coal-fired power plant has
argued 24 that Public Resources Code Section 25500 gives the
Commission, instead of the ARB, the authority to issue air
quality permits for power plants. The ARB disagrees.2 5 The ARB
argues that because it has authority to prepare the federallyrequired SIP, and the federal Clean Air Act requires that the
SIP contain a permit process for new stationary pollution sources,
the APCD's, in conjunction with the ARB, are, therefore, issuing
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permits under the aegis of federal law.
authority to issue

11

in lieu of

11

Thus, the Commission•s

permits does not apply because

that authority exists only to the extent allowed by federal law.
The question is:

Which agency should have authority to issue

air quality permits for power plants?

A recent opinion of the

California Legislative Council sheds light on this question.

•

The opinion makes the following points:
Under current state and federal law, the Energy
Resources Conservation and Development Commission could
be the permitting authority for thermal power plants,
under the federal Clean Air Act, only if the State
Implementation Plan under such act is revised to specify
the Commission as the agency to function in this capacity,
subject to the approval of the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency.
The Administrator•s regulations under the Clean Air
Act permit a state to divide its permitting functions among
agencies with expertise in the respective areas involved,
such as thermal power plants and air pollution generally.
However, the Administrator does have broad approval and
review powers over State Implementation Plans (see 42
U.S.C. 7410, 7424, and 7502 to 7504, incl.).
Consequently, in our opinion, the Legislature, by
statute, could designate the Commission as, or require that
the Commission be, the permitting authority for thermal
power plants under the Clean Air Act; but such a designation,
as part of the plan, would be subject to review and approval
of the Administrator.
There is no prohibition in the Clean Air Act against
a state dividing responsibility for preparation of the
State Implementation Plan among various agencies with
expertise in respective areas. However, as a practical
matter, there would have to be some ultimate authority to
decide any conflicts between the agencies involved, and an
agency representing a state, .. in our opinion, would
necessarily have to present the plan as an integrated whole
to the Administrator, with all conflicts in its provisions
resolved (e.g., see 42 U.S.C. 7410) ,26
11
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Whether the EPA would be willing to designate the Commission,
or another agency, as the air quality permitting authority for
power plants under the SIP is not known.

The EPA may be unwilling

to allow the state to bifurcate air quality permitting authority
in the SIP.

Furthermore, the Clean Air Act requires an

"environmental" agency at the state level to prepare the SIP; the
Commission is not an

11

environmental

11

agency.

The existence of state ambient air quality standards has been
another source of conflict in air quality regulation.

Federal

law requires only that the SIP contain methods for meeting federal
air quality standards; there is no requirement that the SIP contain
methods for meeting the more stringent state standards.

The ARB,

however, intended originally to include in the SIP measures for
meeting state standards.

The rationale behind this move was

that utilities and APco•s would have to deal only with one set
of standards.
become

11

Moreover, the methods for meeting standards would

federalized 11 and, therefore, subject to stronger enforce-

ment than the state could provide.

The ARB has no doubts,depending

on the site, about the ability of new power plants to meet the
state standards.
The ARB decided recently, however, that the SIP will not
contain methods for meeting state standards because utilities
and manufacturers expressed concern that federalizing the state
standards would mean that, even in an emergency situation, the
state could not override its own air quality standards.

Whether

this concern is real or perceived is unclear, however.

Regardless
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of what is in the SIP, the EPA may hesitate to enforce any air
quality standards which exceed federal requirements.
Emissions Control
The Commission siting procedure has been complicated by a
lack of coordination with the ARB on mitigation measures for
emissions from power plants.

•

For example, APCD's can define

Best Available Control Technology (BACT) for power plants within
their jurisdiction.

The result is that BACT definitions are made

on a case-by-case basis and, therefore, have been called a "moving
target".

The Commission has been unable to specify in its siting

process what BACT is for a particular electricity-generating
technology.
Trade-off requirements have also been a moving target.

The

ARB's policy has been that emission reductions may not be
counted as trade-offs if the reductions are necessary to comply
with proposed federal, state, or district rules and regulations.
Thus, every time a district proposes a new regulation, the
a v a il a b1e trade- o f f s dec rea s e . and . t h.e. ba.s e. 1 i: ne a g a i nst. wh. i. c tt
trade-offs are measured may change.

There has been no way to

fix the available trade-offs within the Commission's siting
procedure, but recent NSR rules allow the purchase of trade-offs
when a NOI is filed.

Although the ARB does not have responsibility

for energy conservation programs, its regulations affect energy
efficiency in automobiles, industrial processes, and electric
power generation.

The ARB could also require conservation

measures as a method of improving air quality.
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The ARB prepares forecasts of industrial growth in each
air basin to estimate the effects of air quality standards on
various industrial growth scenarios.

These forecasts in turn

could

For example, the ARB's

affect

electricity demand.

forecast may indicate that air quality standards will limit
growth of a particular industry.
may be reduced.

Energy demand, therefore,

The Commission and the ARB currently do not

coordinate their respective forecasting efforts.

The Commis-

sion and the ARB also use different forecasting methodologies.
Agreement Between the ARB/APCD's and the Commission
The agreement provides for increased cooperation between
the Commission and the ARB in deciding on the compliance of
power plants with state and federal air quality standards.

Two

significant features of the proposed agreement are:
a)

The ARB/APCD review of a proposed power plant would
take place during the Commission's siting procedure.
The agreement requires the applicant to submit during
the notice of intention (NOI) stage, instead of the
application for certification (AFC) stage, most of the
detailed information which the ARB/APCD's need to
determine whether a proposed power plant can be built
at a particular site.

b)

If a proposed power plant cannot meet all applicable
state air quality standards, the Commission can still
certify the facility if, among other conditions, it
meets federal air quality standards.

The agreement applies to all power plants for which an APCD
must issue an Authority to Construct permit.

Its provisions

will go into the Commission's administrative regulations governing NOI and AFC proceedings.

The provisions of the agreement
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will also be part of the NSR rules in the SIP.

The agreement

is summarized below.
Notice of Intention Stage
During the first phase of the NOI proceedings, the APCD or
the ARB must submit a report to the Commission.

The report

would include:

•

1)

A "preliminary specific .. definition of Best
Available Control Technology (BACT).

2)

A preliminary discussion of whether there is a
"substantial likelihood .. that the plant can be
approved at each site proposed in the NOI.

3)

A preliminary list of federal and state air quality
regulations which the plant must meet.

If none of the proposed sites is acceptable from an air
quality standpoint, the ARB/APCD's may suggest, prior to the
end of the nonadjudicatory hearings in the first phase of the
NOI, an alternative site where the proposed facility is more
likely to meet air quality standards.

In such cases, the

Commission may direct the NOI applicant to evaluate .. major
siting constraints .. for presentation during the second (i.e.,
adjudicatory hearing) phase of the NOI.
In its NOI decision, the Commission may not approve any
site unless there is a

11

substantial likelihood .. that applicable

air quality standards can be met at the site.

If no such site

is identified, and the Commission determines that a

facilit~

is

needed, it may select a single site that is most likely to meet
air quality standards.
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Application for Certification Stage
Within nine months of the time an AFC is filed (six months
if a 12-month AFC applies), the AFCD must submit its
determination of compliance 11

•

11

final

If the proposed facility complies

with air quality standards, the local Air Pollution Control
Office (APCO) specifies permit conditions, including BACT and,
if necessary, emissions trade-offs.

If the facility does not

comply, the APCO would specify those rules and regulations which
the facility violates and those with which it complies.

The

APco•s final determination is subject to appeal to the ARB.
The Commission•s AFC decision must include

11

findings and

conclusions 11 on the facility•s conformance with air quality
standards, based on the APco•s final determination.

If the

facility complies, the Commission•s certificate must include all
conditions necessary to maintain compliance.
not comply, the

Com~ission

the ARB or APCD to

11

If the facility does

mediates between the applicant and

Correct or eliminate 11 the noncompliance.

If

the noncompliance cannot be corrected, the Commission may certify
the facility if the following conditions are met:
1)

The Commission determines that the facility is required
for the 11 public convenience and necessity 11 •

2)

Th e r e a r e n·o t mo r e 11 p r u den t an d f e a s i b 1e me a ns o f a c h i e ving the public convenience and necessity 11 •

3)

The facility meets all 11 provisions and schedules required
by the Clean Air Act 11 (i.e., federal standards).

4)

The facility meets all applicable air quality standards
that can be met.
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The APCO must issue a "permit to operate•• if the facility complies
with the conditions in the Commission's certificate.
Energy-Related Functions of t~e Public Utilities Commission27
General Authority
Article XII of the California Constitution creates the
Public Utilities Commission (PUC) and provides for the PUC's

•

authority over energy-producing facilities.

Sections 3, 5, and

6 give general authority to the PUC and to the Legislature for
the purpose of regulating entities which provide power to the
public.

The PUC is given specific constitutional authority to

fix rates and establish rules for all public utilities.
Section 701 of the Public Utilities Code provides the
general statutory authority to regulate public utilities.

The

PUC does not regulate municipally-owned utilities.
Specific Procedures
1)

Ratemaking
The PUC is charged with setting ••just and reasonable"
rates for public utilities• services (Public Utilities
Code, Section 728).

T~e

California Supreme Court, in

Pacific Tel. & Tel. v. Public Utilities Commission (1965)
described the PUC's general approach to ratemaking:
••. to determine with respect to a •test period'
(1) the rate base of the utility, i.e., value of
the property devoted to public use, (2) gross
operating revenues, and {3) costs and expenses
allowed for rate-making purposes, resulting in
(4) net revenues produced, sometimes termed
•results of operatiqns•. Then, by determining
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the fair and reasonable rate of return to be
fixed or allowed the utility upon its rate base,
and comparing the net revenue which would be
achieved at that rate with the net revenue of the
test period, the commission determines whether and
how much the utility's rates and charges should be
raised or lowered ...
A utility initiates a rate case by filing an
application with PUC.

After an adjudicatory hearing,

including sworn testimony and cross-examination, the
PUC's decision is made by a majority vote of the five
commissioners.

After possible rehearings, the PUC's

decision is appealable only to the California Supreme
Court.

The public is given an opportunity to participate

in rate cases through informal hearings held in several
locations within the area served by the utility seeking
the rate increase.28
The PUC has also developed special ratemaking procedures which provide for rate adjustments outside of
general rate proceedings.

These procedures were

initiated because rising fuel costs and inflation have
complicated general rate proceedings to the point where
utilities experienced a lag time in PUC rate adjustments.
2)

Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity
Public Utilities Code Section 1001 requires every
gas and electric corporation under the PUC's jurisdiction
to obtain from the PUC a Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity (CPCN} before constructing facilities. 29
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In the past, the Puc•s review of a utility•s proposal
prior to issuing the CPCN constituted the power plant
siting procedure.

Currently, however, the Energy

Commission•s (Commission) siting procedure supplants
most of the Puc•s siting jurisdiction.

Although utili-

ties must still obtain a CPCN, the puc•s siting
jurisdiction is limited to the implications of a proposed project on a utility•s financial standing and to
the rate implications of a proposed project.

Thus,

using these two criteria the PUC may reverse the
Commission•s decision to site a power plant by refusing
to issue the CPCN.

For example, the PUC could decide

that a power plant which the Commission has certified
will bankrupt the utility or impose an unfair burden on
ratepayers.

To avoid this possibility, the PUC parti-

cipates in Commission proceedings which will eventually
require a CPCN.
The PUC retains exclusive jurisdiction over electric
transmission lines not directly related to power plants,
and over all intrastate natural gas facilities.

Only

about 10% of California•s gas is categorized as intrastate gas, however.

The PUC also has exclusive authority

to certify power plants which California•s investor-owned
utilities choose to build outside the state.
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PUC decisions on applications for a CPCN are made
in formal hearings involving a commissioner and an
administrative law judge.

The PUC maintains that these

formal proceedings are necessary in order to develop
a record which will support PUC decisions if the
decisions are appealed to the California Supreme Court.
In deciding on whether to issue a CPCN, the PUC must
comply with the provisions of the California
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).
3)

Forecasting
As part of every general rate case, the PUC conducts short-term forecasts (i.e., one or two years) of
energy supply and demand.

The PUC also conducts a

three-year forecast of natural gas supply and demand
on a semiannual basis for use in gas rate cases.
The PUC conducts long-term natural gas forecasts
{10-20 years) in connection with its responsibilities
to assure an adequate supply of natural gas.
10-year gas forecast is published annually.

The Puc•s
Although

utilities are also required to submit their own 10-year
gas forecasts to the PUC, the PUC maintains that its
forecast is

~n

••independent assessment of supply and

demand".30
In carrying out its responsibilities concerning
an adequate supply of electricity, the PUC relies on
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the Commission•s long-range electricity forecasts.
Recently, however, the PUC fssued an Order Instituting
Investigation (OII) concerning the resource plans of both
San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) and Pacific
Gas & Electric Company (PG&E).

According to the PUC,

these investigations (OII s No. 4 and 26, respectively)
1

are not intended to duplicate the Commission•s forecastI

ing plans; the PUC maintains that these investigations
will help the PUC participate meaningfully in future
Commission proceedings by ••providing comments on financial and rate impacts of proposed facilities .31
11

The

PUC is also required (Public Resources Code Sections
25302, 25303) to evaluate the 5-, 10-, and 20-year forecasts which utilities submit to the Commission.

The Com-

mission uses these forecasts in preparing the Biennial
Report.
4)

The PUC is generally responsible for the conservation
efforts which affect utilities.

These responsibilities

include:
Setting utility rates, including inverted rate
structures, to reward customers who reduce their
energy consumption.
Establishing tariff rules to reduce waste and nonessential uses of electricity.
Determining appropriate levels of utility expenditures
for cost-effective energy conservation.
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Developing and adopting a utility Home Insulation
Assistance and Financ{ng Program.
Determining appropriate rules and general orders
governing utility service quality including voltage
standards.
To implement these functions more effectively, the
PUC established an Energy Conservation Team on
January 1, 1976.

The team is now part of the PUC's

Utilities Division.
The PUC uses its rate jurisdiction as an enforcement mechanism for utility conservation efforts.

The

PUC may recommend a reduced rate of return if a utility
does not demonstrate vigorous, imaginative and effective
conservation efforts.

The PUC claims that its conserva-

tion program has caused utilities to expand substantially
their conservation activities during the past two years.32
Unfortunately, there is no formal method for incorporating utilities• conservation efforts into the Commission's
procedures.
The Commission also has statutory authority over
energy conservation.

In general, the Commission con-

centrates on non-utility conservation efforts such as
insulation standards, home appliance efficiency, residential and nonresidential building standards, and
transportation.

The Commission has promotional respon-

sibilities in conservation, such as domestic outreach
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and educational programs.

The Commission also inter-

venes in the PUC's conservation proceedings.
5)

Load Management
Although the Commission has general authority to
adopt cost-effective load management standards (Public
Resources Code Section 25403.5), the PUC has a role in
implementing the standards.

For example, load manage-

ment may require a "time of use" rate structure which
the PUC must approve.

Through its rate jurisdiction in

such cases, the PUC also determines whether a particular
load management technique is cost-effective.
6)

Alternative Energy Sources
a.

Solar Energy
PUC policy on solar energy is just now emerging.
Through its ratemaking authority the PUC can provide
incentives for solar development by, (1) providing
higher rates of return for utilities investing in
solar energy (Public Utilities Code, Section 454),
or (2) by offering higher gas service priorities to
customers who use solar equipment.

The PUC's author-

ity to adopt lifeline rates for gas and electricity
also affects solar development.

Lifeline rates de-

termine whether solar energy is economical for some
applications.
69

PUC regulation of utility involvement in solar
energy is unclear.

The PUC and Commission recently

held joint hearings on utility involvement in solar
energy; the PUC now intends to hold additional
hearings on its own.

Currently, utilities are

required to obtain PUC approval before marketing
solar equipment (Chapter 1102, Statutes of 1978).
The PUC is also required to investigate the
feasibility of a solar energy loan program
(Chapter 1100, Statutes of 1978).
b.

Cogeneration and Geothermal
As with solar energy, the PUC's jurisdiction
over rates and utilities' returns on investments
gives the PUC leverage to encourage the use of
cogeneration and geothermal energy.
The PUC recently required PG&E, Southern
California Edison, and SDG&E to submit rate proposals
to increase cogeneration and to identify their
respective potential for cogeneration projects.

The

PUC subsequently issued a report which identified
1,650 MW of cogeneration potential in the service
areas of the three utilities.
7)

Electric Transmission Lines
The PUC has jurisdiction over electric transmission
lines not related specifically to power plants.
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The

Commission has jurisdiction over transmission lines from
power plants to the first junction with an interconnected
grid.
In practice, the PUC and the Commission have disagreed on the extent of their respective jurisdictions. 33
The disputes are based on the definition of the junction

•

with an interconnected grid .
8)

Review of Utility Research and Development Plans
In the past, the PUC ganarally did hot
to use ratepayer's money for R&D.

Within

allo~

t~e

utilities

past five

years, however, the PUC has taken a different view of
R&D, mostly as a result of dwindling energy resources.
Now utilities are allowed reimbursement through rates
for part of their R&D investments.

The PUC obviously

can influence the R&D priorities of utilities by specifying which investments will be reimbursed.

PU Code

Section provides the authority for reimbursement for R&D
through rates.

Section 454 allows an increased rate of

return for utilities investing in specified alternative
energy projects.
Conflicts Between PUC and Commission
1)

Siting
Both the Public Utilities Commission and the Energy
Commission issue certificates for power plants.
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As

stated previously, the PUC can deny a CPCN after the
Commission has issued its certification.

Thus, a

utility can spend considerable time and money during
the Commission's certification process only to have the
PUC deny approval of the project.

The PUC must

coordinate its review with the Commission's siting
process to provide an early decision on whether the
utility can finance its proposal.

Although the PUC is
updating General Order (G.O.} 13la3 4 in an effort to
provide better Commission/PUC coordination in the siting
process, the CPCN may still add several months to the
time required for approval of projects.
The PUC's investigations of utilities' resource
plans (Oil's No. 4 and 26) may duplicate parts of the
Commission's planning process.

As stated previously,

recent legislation appears to have expanded the Commission's role in resource plans.
The PUC is in a position to influence state energy
policy.

For example, the PUC has adopted the policy that

the state should use natural gas in power plants until a
transition can be made to alternative energy sources.
This policy appears to conflict with current Commission
policy which appears to favor coal and oil.
Energy-Related Functions of the State Water Resources Control Board 35
General Authority
The State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) and nine
regional water control boards share responsibility for regulating
water quality in the state.
to administer water rights.

The SWRCB has additional authority
The general statutory authority of
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the SWRCB and the regional boards is stated in Public Resources
Code Sections 13150 et seq.
Specific Procedures
l)

Water Quality
The SWRCB's energy-related functions, as well as
jurisdictional conflicts with the Commission, can be
illustrated through the following examples.
Example One:

A utility discharging "once through ..

cooling water to surface water must, under federal law
(Clean Water Act), obtain a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit.

The SWRCB and the

regional boards are the only agencies which the EPA
authorizes to issue NPDES permits.
Thermal pollution is the principal concern in oncethrough cooling water discharges.

Although the NPDES

perm i t can i nc 1ude 1 i mi t s on the d i s charge of heat, ·the
federal government has not developed thermal pollution
standards.

The state, however, has developed

stringent thermal pollution standards which are contained
in the SWRCB's federally-required Thermal Plan.

Thus,

NPDES permits reflect state thermal pollution standards
which have become "fed era 1 i zed" in the Thermal Plan.

A

question may arise whether the Commission has statutory
authority to override the NPDES permit conditions.

This

jurisdictional issue probably will not arise for inland power
plants

which

do not use once-through cooling water.
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A similar jurisdictional problem concerns the
federal requirement that cooling water intake structures
use the
mental

11

best technology for minimizing adverse environ-

impact[s]~ · on

fish and other organisms.

This

requirement applies to both fresh water and ocean water
intake structures.

The Commission may have authority

under state law to adopt a different definition of

11

best

technology 11 than the SWRCB adopts.
These examples demonstrate that the SWRCB and the
regional boards occupy a position regarding water similar
to the ARB/APco•s position with respect to federal law
regarding air quality.
Example Two:

Some large power plants use evaporation

ponds to dispose of cooling water.

Although a NPDES

permit is not required for evaporation ponds, a permit
is required under state law because of possible adverse
effects on the quality of groundwater.

The SWRCB and

the regional boards are authorized to administer this
permit program.

A question arises, however, whether the

Commission has the authority to issue this permit for
power plants.

The SWRCB indicates that its cooperation

with the Commission has prevented any jurisdictional
conflicts over this issue.
Example Three:

The SWRCB, through its Clean Water

Grants Program, funds sewage treatment facilities.
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The

SWRCB will make a special effort to coordinate the
design of treatment facilities from which water can be
reclaimed for power plant cooling, if the utilities'
plans are
2)

available to the SWRCB as early as possible.

Water Rights
Before the SWRCB issues a right to appropriate
surface water, including water for power plant cooling,
it must make two findings:
a.

There is sufficient water available after the
requirements of prior water rights have been
satisfied.

b.

The intended use of water is reasonable, beneficial,
and in the public interest.
Both of these findings require the SWRCB to exercise

discretion.

So far, the SWRCB has accommodated the

Commission's power plant siting process in its water
rights decisions; utilities usually secure rights to
cooling water before submitting a notice of intention
(NOI) to the Commission.

Thus, the issue of whether

the Commission, instead of the SWRCB, has the authority
to administer water rights for power plants has not
arisen.
The second finding offers additional opportunity
for conflict, however.

Article 2, Section X of the
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California Constitution, which is the fundamental water
rights law of the state, prohibits the waste or unreasonable diversion of water.

Furthermore, the SWRCB's Power

Plant Cooling Policy strongly discourages the use of
fresh inland water for power plant cooling.

The policy

states that the loss of inland water through evaporation
in a power plant cooling facility may be considered an
unreasonable use of inland water when general shortages
occur.

Thus, the question may arise whether the

Commission or the SWRCB has the ultimate authority to
decide if the use of inland fresh water for power plant
cooling is reasonable.
In his testimony before the Advisory Committee,
Mr. William J. Miller, of the SWRCB, stated that the
SWRCB and the Commission currently have a satisfactory,
though informal, relationship in power plant siting cases.
Miller suggested that the SWRCB's current statutory
authority remain intact.

Miller also stated that SWRCB

is willing to have a member participate in appropriate
portions of the Commission's proceedings.
Energy-Related Functions of the State Solid Waste Management Board
Although ACR 177 did not mention the Solid Waste Management
Board (SWMB) as an agency whose authority conflicts with the
Commission's, such conflicts may arise in two areas:

(1) responsi-

bility for developing waste-to-energy programs and facilities, and
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(2) the issuance of permits for power plants which generate
solid waste and store the waste at the power plant site.
Waste-to-Energy
The SWMB is responsible for developing a research and
development program for recovering solid wastes and converting
the wastes to energy (Government Code, Section 66785).

"This

program includes the design, construction and testing of pilot
equipment for processing solid wastes.36

The SWMB is also

responsible for demonstrating the feasibility of recycling and
converting agricultural wastes into synthetic fuels (Section
66786.5).
The Commission has similar responsibilities, including
technical assessment studies on:
l)

Methods of recycling, extracting, processing, fabricating,
handling, or disposing of materials, e~pecially materials
which require large commitments of energy (Public
Resources Code, Section 25602h).

2)

Methods of recycling materials and its effect on
energy consumption (Section 25602i).

3)

Use of agricultural products, municipal wastes, and
organic refuse as an energy source (Section 25602m).

The SWMB suggests that it should have full authority over
research and development of waste-to-energy projects and that the
Commission should have authority over research and development
in crops grown specifically for fuel (i.e., biomass conversion) • 37
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Permits for Solid Waste Disposal
If California relies on coal-fired power plants in the
future, solid waste resulting from coal combustion may become an
issue in power plant siting.

For example, Pacific Gas and

Electric•s proposed coal-fired facility, Fossil 1 and 2, would
generate more waste than disposal sites in the area can handle.
Thus, the Fossil 1 and 2 site must have its own waste disposal
area.

Since all solid waste disposal areas must obtain permits

from agencies other than the Commission, the question may arise
whether the Commission has the authority to issue solid waste
permits for power plants.
Both the regional water quality boards and the county solid
waste enforcement agencies, with the approval of the SWMB, issue
permits for solid waste disposal facilities. 38 The SWMB is not
required to approve the regional boards• permits; the permits may
be appealed to the SWMB.

If hazardous solid waste, as defined

by the federal Resources Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA) is involved, the Department of Health, instead of the
county solid waste enforcement agency, issues a waste facility
permit.
The regional water quality board permit and the county
enforcement agency permit are issued under state law.

Thus,

Public Resources Code Section 25500 may give the Commission
the authority to issue these permits for power plants.

The

Department of Health (DOH) permit for hazardous waste, however,
is issued under the aegis of RCRA.
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Since the U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) is generally unwilling to bifurcate its
state-administered enforcement programs, the Commission probably
could not issue this permit for power plants. 3 9
Jurisdictional conflicts over solid waste have not been a
serious problem in power plant siting cases.

In the Sundesert

nuclear facility siting case, a permit from the regional water
quality board would have been required if the case had proceeded
to the AFC stage.

Since the Commission was willing to accept the

regional board's permit conditions in the Sundesert case, the
question of which agency issued the permit was immaterial. 40 In
the Fossil l and 2 siting case, which is in the NOI stage
(Docket No. 77-NOI-4), the nature of the solid waste is not
sufficiently well-defined to determine if the waste is hazardous.
The Commission is trying to form a task force on solid waste
permits for power plants.

This task force, which would include

the SWMB, the DOH, and the State Water Resources Control Board,
would attempt to specify early in the siting process the information a utility must submit in order to comply with solid waste
permit requirements.
Energy-Related Functions of the California Coastal Commission
General Authority
The California Coastal Commission has general authority over
conservation and - development in the coastal zone (Public Resources
Code, Sections 30000 et seq.).
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Specific Procedures
The Coastal Commission has no permit authority over power
plants in the coastal zone.

The Coastal Commission does have

authority (Section 30413), however, to map the coastal zone in
such a way that some areas are designated as unsuitable for power
plants.

These areas, which are known as

11

designated areas .. , are

often valuable coastal resources and are generally unsuitable for
power plants because of geographical considerations.
coast is an example of a designated area.

The Big Sur

The Commission is

prohibited by law from siting power plants in designated areas unless
the Coastal Commission makes specific findings (Section 25526a).
During the mapping process, the Coastal Commission must
consider the content of the Commission's most recent Biennial
Report.

Thus, the Coastal Commission is aware of the Commission's

demand forecast when it maps the coast.
must be updated every two years.

Furthermore, the maps

During the updating, previously

undesignated areas may be designated and vice versa.
The Coastal Commission completed its mapping task in
September 1978.

According to the maps, designated areas comprise

about one-quarter of the coast.

About one-half of the coast is

mapped in such a way that designated and undesignated areas are
interspersed.

The final quarter of the coast is undesignated.

Of this final quarter, one-half is currently under federal
ownership.
According to the Coastal Commission,41 this mapping approach
provides utilities with a hierarchy of possible choices for power
80

0

plant sites.
0

Utilities should look first at areas of the coast

where power plants already exist; the second choice should be the
undesignated quarter of the coast; the third choice would be the
interspersion of designated and undesignated areas; and the fourth
choice would be designated areas.
The Coastal Commission may also participate in Commission

•

siting proceedings.

When a coastal power plant site is under

consideration in a siting case, the Coastal Commission recommends
terms and conditions for protection of coastal resources which the
Commission must implement unless they are infeasible.
Conflicts Between the Coastal Commission and the Commission
Despite the existence of undesignated areas on the coast, a
question remains whether the coastal power plant siting option,
which implies the use of ocean water instead of fresh water, is
available.

The Warren-Alquist Act (Public Resources Code Section

25516. 1) prohibits the Commission from certifying any facilities
on a coastal site unless the coastal site has "greater relative
merit•• than alternative sites.42
merit 11 is not defined.

The term "greater relative

Thus, given a choice between expanding

facilities at a coastal site and constructing facilities at a
new, inland site, the Commission could choose the inland site.
Another source of conflict between the Coastal Commission
and the Commission is the Coastal Commission•s classification of
certain coastal areas as designated (i.e., unsuitable) for power
plants but undesignated for other related uses, such as access to
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seawater for a power plant further inland.

In such

11

part1ally

designated .. areas, a utility could build seawater access facilities,
for example, without the Coastal Commission's approval.
The Commission has expressed doubt about the legality of
partial designation.43

Whether the courts will interpret partial

designation as identical with total designation is unclear.

The

issue probably will not be decided until a utility proposes to
build facilities in a partially designated area.
Energy-Related Functions of the Department of Conservat i on
The Division of Oil and Gas in the Department of Conservation
regulates activities associated with geothermal energy production.
The Division regulates drilling, casing requirements, steam flow,
and maintenance for geothermal wells.

The Department has

received a grant from the U.S. Department of Energy to expedite
geothermal development in the state.

The grant will allow the

Department to investigate federal geotherma l leasing practices;
electrical transmission cor.ridor access; loca l planning policies;
low temperature, direct heat applications for geothermal steam;
and incentives for geothermal development.
Energy-Related Functions of the Business and Transportation Agency
The SolarCal Office in the Bus i ness and Transportation Agency
is seeking to provide financial and regulatory incentives for
solar energy development.

SolarCal is also trying to develop

an effective consumer warranty insurance program for solar
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0

equipment.

The Office and

t~e

SolarCal Council, 38-member board

appointed by the Governor, advises the Governor in solar energy
issues.

The Office and the Board are trying to develop a solar

plan for California.

The Office works closely with builders and

financial institutions on solar projects and provides the "focal
point" in state government for solar energy issues.
Energy-Related Functions of the Office of Appropriate Technology
The Office of Appropriate Technology (OAT) is part of the
Office of Planning and Research.

OAT was established by executive

order to assist in and to encourage the development of smallscale technology and the use of renewable resources.

OAT is

currently involved in alternative energy projects concerning
wind, solar, and biomass.

OAT administers a program to provide

grants to individuals developing small-scale technologies.

OAT

also provides information to the public on renewable energy
resources.
Energy-Related Functions of the State Architect
The State Architect encourages the use of conservation
measures and solar energy in state buildings.

This section on agencies' responsibilities demonstrates that
several different agencies have authority to initiate research and
development efforts for alternative energy technologies.

This

diverse responsibility is another example of the current lack of
coordination in the state's energy-related functions.
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utilities submit in a NOI at least one site not in the coastal
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ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ACR 177 created a 12-member advisory committee to assist
the Joint Committee in determining what changes, if any, should
be made in the organization of the state's energy-related functions.

The following persons served on the Advisory Committee:

Roy Alper
Director, California Citizens Action Group, Berkeley

•

Michael Eaton
Energy Coordinator, Sierra Club, Sacramento
David Fogarty
Senior Vice-President, Southern California Edison Company,
Rosemead
Thomas Graff
Regional Counsel, Environmental Defense Fund, Berkeley
Joseph Houghteling
Chairman, Bay Conservation and Development Commission,
Atherton
Frederick Mielke
Executive Vice President, Pacific Gas and Electric Company,
San Francisco
Sandy Motley
Councilwoman, City of Davis, Davis
Michael Peevey
President, California Council for Environmental and Economic
Balance, San Rafael
Phyllis Price
Energy Director, California League of Women Voters, Salinas
William Robertson
Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Los Angeles County Federation
of Labor, Los Angeles
William Walbridge
General Manager, Sacramento Municipal Utility District,
Sacramento
Leo Wyler
Chairman of the Board, TRE Corporation, Los Angeles
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....

The Advisory Committee met six times.

Most of the meetings

were devoted to taking testimony from representatives of those
state agencies whose authority affects the energy regulatory
process.

The Advisory Committee heard from (in order of presen-

tation):
Gene Varanini, Commissioner
California Energy Commission
William Ahern
Ports and Energy Coordinator
California Coastal Commission
Frederick John, Executive Director
California Public Utilities Commission
William Miller
Member, State Water Resources Control Board
Tom Austin, Executive Director
Air Resources Board
Allen Pasternak, Commissioner
California Energy Commission
The Advisory Committee reached consensus on few issues.

At

first, the Advisory Committee appeared to be polarized -- half
of the members sought substantial changes in the current regulatory process, including abolition of the Commission; the other
half sought to maintain the Commission•s integrity while implementing changes in the relationship between state agencies.

At

the November 29, 1978 meeting the members agreed, however, that
subsequent discussions should address the question of whether
there is a need in the state•s energy-related functions for:
1.

A well-articulated and understandable energy policy.

2.

Greater certainty in the regulatory process including
coordinated decisions by the California Energy Commission,
the Air Resources Board, the Water Resources Control
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Board,

the Public Utilities Commission, etc.

3.

Greater visibility in the supply planning.

4.

Political accountability.

5.

Increased public participation.

6.

Less legalistic procedures in order to facilitate public
participation.

Toward the end of the Advisory Committee's tenure, the
members• opinions became diversified.

Following the final meeting

on January 3, 1979, each member submitted to the Joint Committee
his or her individual recommendations on reorganizing the state's
energy-related functions.
The Joint Committee received as a separate document a complete list of the issues on which the Advisory Committee voted
at the final meeting, as well as each member's final statement.
Those issues on which the Advisory Committee reached consensus
at the final meeting are summarized below:
Conclusions
1)

The existing organization of state government does not
provide an articulate and understandable statement of
state energy policy.

2)

The existing organization of state government does not
provide certainty and coordination in the regulatory
process (i.e., forecasting, determination of technologies
and fuel types, review of supply plans, selection of site
for facilities).

3)

Public participation in the Commission's proceedings,
other than siting cases, is far from adequate.

4}

The existing organization of state government does not
provide for an adequate amount of political accountability.
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Recommendations
1)

As a general principle, two regulatory agencies should
not perform the same regulatory function.

2)

A Resources Management Council should be created by the
Governor to help coordinate and ensure communication
among executive branch agencies.

3)

The Legislature should adopt a unified timetable for all
findings, determinations and certificates necessary for
the siting process.
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ANALYSIS OF THE COMMISSION'S EFFECTIVENESS
AND OF ALTERNATIVES FOR REORGANIZATION
In executing its energy-related responsibilities, state government performs three
policy:
role.

functions~

The · firlt function is

establis~ing

energy

The Governor and the Legislature currently assume this
Second is articulating energy policy:

Articulation refers

to defining how policies will be carried out; it is a planning
function.

Third is implementing policy:

State agencies ar.e

responsible for both policy articulation and

implementat~on.

None of these functions may be performed effectively by
itself.

Energy policy cannot be carried to the implementation

stage while conflicting policies and planning efforts exist.
Thus, the state must assure that its energy policies are consistent with other resource policies and that all agencies• planning
and implementation efforts are well coordinated.
This section will examine the following aspects of the state's
energy-related responsibilities:
1)

The consistency of the state's energy policies.

2)

The degree of coordination in the state's energy
planning efforts.

3)

The degree of political accountability which the
structure of the state's energy-related functions
allows.

4)

The internal organization of the Energy Commission.

5)

The effectiveness of the state's efforts to develop
alternative energy technologies.

6)

Public participation.

7)

The problems inherent in combining regulatory and
administrative functions in one agency.
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Energy Policy
The purpose of energy policy is to guide and direct governmental and private sector resources into areas which will benefit
the public.

State policy should provide the framework within

which the various entities concerned with energy development and
consumption can plan for the future.
make its policy known.

The policy

The state, therefore, must

mu~t

be articulated through

plans and regulations, and implemented by the responsible agencies.
The Legislature and the Governor have established certain
overall energy policies.

It ts clear that nuclear energy shall

not be used until certain issues regarding the disposal of longlived radioactive wastes are solved. 1

Geothermal energy, repower-

ing of existing power plants (the conversion of an existing steam
cycle plant to one with both a steam cycle and a gas turbine),
power plants using other than commercially available technologies,
and cogeneration plants have all received the de facto approval
of the Legislature by reason of the special, expedited siting
procedures which have been required for these sources. 2

The

Governor and Legislature have arro·cons-1Cfered--propo-s.aTs. to -;~pe-dite
the siting of coal-ftred power plants. 3 Alternative technologies,
such as solar energy, have received special tax incentives.
The Energy Commission, in its AB 1852 report, as well as in
subsequent statements before the Legislature, has announced that
coal and domestic California oil should be the base load fuels
for the immediate future.

The PUC, in its LNG decision, declared

that natural gas should be the transition fuel to the solar energy
society. 4 The ARB, despite earlier pronouncements during preparation of the AB 1852 report, argues that combined cycle power plants
may pose substantial problems 1n

meetin·g·-a"fr--quiiit~y
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standards due



to the necessity for substantial pollution trade-offs, and has
proposed rules in favor of using
able.5

natur~l

gas when it is avail-

Finally, the federal government has stated that "natural

gas or petroleum shall not be used as a primary energy source for
new electric power plants and no new electric power plant may be
constructed without the capacity to use coal or any other alternate
fuel as a primary energy source". 6 There are limited exceptions to
this pol icy.

These elements or!: state energy pol icy· appear.- to _be

inconsistent and are at least confusing and uncoordinated.
The Commission•s Biennial Report was to have focused policy
alternatives for the Legislature and the Governor.

The environ-

mental impacts, the costs, and the feasibility of various
alternatives were to be assessed. 7 To accomplish these objectives,
coordination and knowledge of other agencies• permit process
requirements is necessary.

The first Biennial Report failed to

provide this coordination.

The reason for this failure was not

an oversight or error on the part of the Commission.

The Warren-

Alquist Act places the Commission in the position of lead energy
agency without the authority necessary to require coordination
with other agencies.

For example, there is no requirement for the

ARB or the local air pollution control districts to coordinate
their regulatory or planning activities with the Commission.

While

the Commission may not have vigorously attempted such coordination,
it has no authority to demand such coordination.

The second

Biennial Report, due in the spring of 1979, may make improvements
in analysis, but there is no guarantee of increased coordination.
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The Commission's first Biennial Report could not have been
expected to provide the kind of guidance necessary for policy
articulation.
problems.

The agency was new and still experiencing start-up

In addition, the Warren-Alquist Act dealt almost

exclusively with electrical energy policy, and not overall energy
policy.

The Report should have provided, however, the focal point

for conflict identification and resolution.
Thus, despite several legislative attempts to increase the
state's ability to define energy policy and plan for future needs,
California does not have a declarative and understandable energy
policy.

Elements of a policy exist, but they are confused, ill-

planned, and unfocused.
Policy Articulation:

fhe - Planning Function

The Warren-Alquist Act did not provide for the state to
specify energy development plans.

Instead, it established a

planning process which has three phases:

the Biennial Report,

the Notice of Intention (NOI), and the Application for Certification (AFC).

At each stage the public interacts with the Commis-

sion and an applicant.

Each stage progressively narrows the

issues, from the broad generic issues in the Biennial Report, to
the specific issues of plant design in the AFC.
The present energy planning framework requires the state's
utilities to submit forecasts of future electricity demand and
to indicate the resources which will be required to meet demand.
The Commission examines these foreeasts, reviews them independently,
and adopts an official state forecast.
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The forecast is contained in the Biennial Report for 5 ,' 12,
and 20 years.

As part of the Report, the Commission must also

determine which technologies are

av~il~ble

and the relative merits of each.

This

for use in the state

"br~cketing"

of technolo-

gies is then used as the criterion to judge alternatives proposals
at the NOI stage.
Unfortunately, planning by state government has not led to
more certainty that our energy needs will be met and has not provided guidance to utilities and other governmental entities on
preferred energy sources.

The process is now characterized by

multiple, disjointed and uncoordinated planning activities which
do not accurately reflec_t ._energy-·needs. -Despite the passage of Warren-Alquist, there is no central
agency which coordinates energy policy and provides for its
implementation.

Pieces of energy policy are articulated by the

Commission, the PUC, the ARB, and others, but there is little consistency among these agencies.

Without the early involvement of these

agencies and their analyses of the impacts, potential, and feasibility of various energy options, there can be little real
planning for future energy resources.
For example, there has been little or no coordination between
the preparation of the Commission•s Biennial Report and the preparation of local and regional elements of the State Implementation
Plan for air pollution control.

The State Implementation Plan

(SIP) is prepared by local and regional air pollution control
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districts, under the guidance of the State Air Resources Board.
The Plan, which is a requirement of federal law, is to contain
all regulations and control programs which are required to
achieve and maintain federal ambient air quality standards.
Since air quality is the principal constraint governing the use
of many types of energy sources, it would seem imperative that
the Biennial Report and air quality planning be coordinated.
Unfortunately, this has not been the case.
To illustrate, several draft : local airt quality management plans
assume future base load capacity from nuclear plants.

For

example, San Diego County's plan includes power from Sundesert;
the Association of Bay Area Governments' (ABAG) plan includes
power from other "proposed" nuclear plants. 8 These plans are
inconsistent with the Legislature's nuclear policies.

The EPA

noted this inconsistency in its comments on the ABAG plan.
Furthermore, several local air quality plans assume that a substantial proportion of existing fossil fuel-fired capacity will
be retired.

This assumption is inconsistent with the Commission's

policy to encourage

repoweri~g

of

existi~g

oil plants.

Moreover, the Commission stressed in its first Biennial
Report the benefits of cogeneration and estimated a 2000 MW
cogeneration potential in the state. 9 This-estimate-was --madewithout considering whether local air quality plans take into
account the emissions trade-offs necessary for future
tion projects.

c~genera

The South Coast Air Quality Management Dtstrict's
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plan, for example, does not include cogeneration projects. 10

This

lack of coordination between the Commission and air pollution
control districts is due partly to the Commission's belief that
cogeneration projects should be exempt from trade-offs requirements.

A review of state and federal air quality laws indicates,

however, that such exemptions are not possible without statutory
changes.

Thus, the Biennial Report did

not properly coordinate

the state's energy and air quality policies with respect to cogeneration.

Coordination between the Commission and the ARB an

cogeneration did not begin until 1978 when the cogeneration potential from the oil fields in Kern County was threatened by a
proposed ARB rule. 11
While the ARB and local air pollution districts, and not the
Commission, should be held responsible for the contents of the
SIP, its importance to the viability of the Commission's Biennial
Report cannot be underestimated.

The recent agreement between

the Commission and ARB will go a long way toward streamlining the
approval process for specific energy projects.

There remains a

need, however, to integrate air quality and other constraints into
the Commission's process of evaluating preferred energy sources.
Thus, the agreement addresses the siting process, but not the
planning process.

Specific constraints to the development of

energy sources should be carefully evaluated in a format such as
state or regional supply plans, rather than the present projectby-project review.
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The PUC and the SWRCB also

eng~ge

in

planni~g

and

r~gulatory

activities according to their own policies . . The PUC provides for
the future capital investment and research and development activities of the private utilities through rate cases.

The SWRCB has

declared policy on the use of inland water for power plant use.
Thus, each has a planning process which is disconnected from the
Biennial Report but which has a profound effect upon energy development and use.

Furthermore, within its own planning and regulatory

process, an agency can disagree on energy policy and impacts.
Witness the ARB statement on the feasib1lity of s 1T'fng - c.o ai in
Southern C'alffor-ma and the local air-pollufion·--contro ,-d.i s-trict
officer's statement to the contrary.12
Even in the areas where the planning process is more prescribed
and is intended to be integrated by statute, there have been disputes and uncoordinated activity.

The Coastal Commission is re-

quired by statute to take the Commission's comments on its designation process into consideration before it designates parts of the
coast as unsuitable for power plant locations. 13 The Commission
has participated in this designation process and on July 18, 1978,
requested that the Coastal Commission not proceed with its proposed
designation until the Commission and the Coastal Commission could
jointly determine if the
date new power plants.

remaini~g

areas of the coast could accommQ-

The Commission argued that although the

Coastal Commission left 27% of the coast undesignated, a closer
inspection revealed that of the 27%, 11% was in federal hands

and

13% was located in areas known to be unsuitable for power plant
sites, leaving 3% of the coast available for power plant development.
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The Commission stated that of this 3%, it was not known whether a
power plant or any other major facility could be constructed.14
The Coastal Commission passed the proposed designation over these
objections, and provided only 15 minutes for Commission comment.
Another notable example of this lack of coordination and
planning occurred in the Sundesert case before the Commission.

•

The NOI had been approved by the Commission and the issue of an
exemption from the nuclear waste law was being debated by the
Legislature.

The issue of San Diego Gas and Electric's ability

to finance the project was raised in the NOI and the issue was to
be a major point for resolution in the AFC.

Subsequently, the

PUC indicated that San Diego Gas and Electric could not finance
their proposed share of the project.

Both the declaration by the

PUC and the decision to deal with financing in the AFC could have
increased delays and the cost of arriving at a decision.
Uncertainty also results from the planning procedures of
the Commission itself.

The Commission is mandated to certify

sufficient facilities to meet forecasted demand.
casting by the state was to narrow debates

Demand fore-

r~garding

how much

electrical energy would be needed and to provide a basis for
determining "legitimate". need.
.

Once. a demand forecast
is adopted,
.
.

utilities could then plan to meet the demand with resources of
their own choosing and submit applications to the Commission for
approval.

This process should supply an element of certainty

that future needs will be met.
99

There is, however, some doubt as to how well this process
has functioned.

In its testimony before the Advisory Committee,

the Commission indicated that future needs would indeed be met.
The Commission indicated that its adopted forecast showed a need
for 23,800 MW of new generation by 1990, of which 23,777 MW were
under construction, under review by the Commission, or in the
planning stages. 15 The initial list of projects included 2400 MW
of power from the Stanislaus Nuclear Power Project--a project
which is doubtful under current state policy; it included 1500 MW
of power from a Southern California Edison coal plant and 1000 MW
from a Department of Water Resources project which are probably
mutually exclusive, and several thousand megawatts of combined
cycle oil plants which are restricted by federal policy and may
have air quality difficulties. In a subsequent submittal to the
Advisory Committee,1 6 the Commission ~ltered some of the above
resources (e.g., deleting Stanislaus}.
Even if all of the above resources were to prove feasible,
the Commission would have to certify every plant in the resources
plan in order to meet its mandate under Warren-Alquist.

It

would also have to satisfy the requirements of CEQA that alternatives to the projects are exam in e.d.

It is (fo-ul>l ful-- w·he _t.her sub-

stantial consideration could be given to alternatives under these
conditions, given the lead times and planning necessary for large
base load facilities.
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The Commission indicated recently that electricity growth
was not expected to be as high as it has been in the past.

The

Commission indicated that growth in electricity sales is expected
to be lower than the 4.2% projected by utilities and more near
the 1.9% which it has averaged over the past six years.

(This is

electricity sales in kilowatt hours which refers to electricity
sold over time; it is distinguished from peak demand which is the
I

amount of electricity required on a system at any given time.
Utilities must have enough capacity to meet peak demand.)

The

Commission also indicated that if growth does slow down as the
past trend indicates, then utilities could defer 2000 MW of
capacity in 1985 and 6000 MW in 1990.

The above figures are

based on a 2.7% growth rate in electric generating capacity which
the Commission, derived by taking the simple average of figures
represent average growth in electricity sales (1.9%) and in annual
peak demand (3.5%) over the past several years.

It is unlikely

)

that the forthcoming electrical forecast in the Biennial Report
will be at this level or will be derived in the same manner.
These interim forecast a-5-s e-ss-m-ents--addto- the--conlusfon ·an·d·--- -- ---·. --· uncertainty in the

planni~g

process.

The final issue in this area is the nature of the Commission
"mandateu to meet future demand.

The Commission has stated that

"This mandate distinguishes the Commissi.on from most other passive
licensing agencies and commits the state to

playi~g

an active role
in assuring that electrical energy needs are met".l 7 This is
indeed a distinguishing feature of the Warren-Alquist Act, but
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there are questions about its operation and viability.

The man-

date is met, presumably, "by developing alternative ways of meeting electrical energy needs and deciding which alternatives are
realistic and reasonable and.~ .. implementing the choices".lS
These alternatives are tested against applications in the NOI
process.

The difficulty with this procedure is that it occurs

in the latter stages of the regulatory process.

If an alternative

is found, will there be time, political will, and an applicant to
pursue the alternative?

If an applicant does not wish to pursue

the alternative, what will happen?

In the AB 1852 alternative

resource plan this situation arose:

The Commission indicated

that repowering of Silvergate units 3 and 4 was
tive to Sundesert.

San· Diego -Gas·

a· -~)artiif - alterna

a·na·Tiectr rc· fndicafe-d

the

repowering was not feasible and did not pursue the option and
choosing instead to seek ·power- fr'om_____o_ut -.: of-~ state sources.
There are no incentives or procedures to operationalize the
Commission's "mandate" to site needed facilities. - In terms of
planning, even if such incentives or procedures existed, they
would be exercised too late to be effective.

The results are

either failure to meet future demand or the loss of real alternatives because of time and economic constraints.
To summarize, the energy planning process is fractured in
California.

It is characterized by little coordination between

agencies and little integration during the various planning
stages.

Each agency has ifs- ·own· p-roc-es·s-an.dpoYfc.ie.s whfch it

follows, and each is disconnected formally from the Biennial
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Report process.

The results have been increased costs to the rate-

payer, unclear planning procedures for utilities in the state,
and increased uncertainty in planning for future energy needs.
Political Accountability
Energy development and consumption are important considerations in all social, economic, and environmental issues.

•

The

public, therefore, has a vital interest in energy decisions.
State government must provide a clear decision-making structure
which allows the public to demonstrate, through the political
process, its degree of satisfaction with the decisions being made.
Thus, government officials and agencies must remain in a position
of political accountability.
The current energy decision-making structure in state government does not provide for political accountability.
for energy decision is not clearly assigned.

Responsibility

Neither policy

development nor planning functions are assigned to one individual
or agency.
For example, in a recent letter to the U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE), the Chairman of the Commission strongly urged the
federal government to classify California's heavy crude oil as an
alternate energy source under the National Energy Act. 19 Although
this policy could affect the course of California's energy development plans, it is difficult to determine who was making this
policy.

The issue was not brought before the full Commission for

approval or discussion.
Governor's?

Is it the Chairman's policy?

The Commission's?
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The

The Sundesert project provides another example.
mission approved Sundesert in the NOI stage.

The

The Com-

L~gislature

subsequently denied Sundesert a statutory exemption from the
nuclear waste laws, largely as a result of the Commission's
recommendation.

The PUC determined that San Diego Gas and

Electric could not finance the entire project.

Who, or what

agency, was responsible for halting the Sundesert project?
Solar energy development is another area where responsibility
is assigned to several different agencies.

The Commission has

the largest share of state resources for solar energy programs,
particularly those relating to the solar tax credit.

The

SolarCal office and the SolarCal Council take some responsibility
for promoting solar energy in new homes, but so does the Commission.

A third actor is the Office of Appropriate Technology (OAT)

which promotes passive energy designs and structures that use
renewable resources.

A fourth is the Department of Housing and

Community Development with its solar loan program.
This situation exists in other areas.

The PUC makes its

decision on a certificate of public convenience and necessity for
new facilities as much as nine months after the Commission has
issued its certificate for construction of the facility.

The

Commission is responsible for conservation programs, but the PUC
and OAT also have conservation responsibilities.

Electrical

forecasting is the responsibility of the Commission and gas
forecasting the responsibility of the PUC.

104

In the energy field, those state agencies with the most
responsibility (i.e., the Energy Commission and the PUC) have the
least political accountability.
sitting for fixed terms.
accountability.

Both are bodies with members

Commissions are n.oted for their lack of

In 1971, the President's Advisory Council on

Executive Organizations (Ash Council) concluded:
Independent regulatory agencies headed by collegial
bodies do not, and propably cannot, provide for the
political accountability required to insure public
responsibility.
A serious flaw of the collegial structure is an
inability to fix responsibility due to the inherent
diffusion of authority among relatively anonymous
co-equal members. In addition, appointment for
fixed terms gives Commissioners a degree of independence that may serve to protect them from improper
influence, but w~s n~B intended to allow them to
become unrespons1ve.
Independence among co-equal members and insulation from
political influence may be highly desirable in regulatory bodies
whose responsibilities are adjudicatory.

When such bodies are

delegated program responsibilities, it becomes genuinely difficult
to determine who is actually running the program.
Internal Organization of the Commission
The Warren-Alquist Act empowers the Chairman of the Commission
to direct the staff in accordance with the policies of the Commission.

This provision makes the role of the Executive Director

unclear and has reduced the Director's authority.

The Chairman's

vaguely defined responsibility for staff activities may
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hav~

encouraged other Commissioners to involve themselves in administrative matters.

In any event, individual Commissioners

fr~

quently interact with staff on specific matters--e.g., preparation
of the electricity

f~recast,

promotion of solar energy, etc.

This involvement reduces staff independence, blurs the distinction
between the adjudicatory role of Commissioners and the administrative role of the staff, and provides for a poor allocation of
staff resources.
· --

- - --

-·

In most organizations, the chief administrative officer is
responsible for the operation of day-to-day affairs.

This person

ensures that key projects are progressing, reviews staff products,
and sets program goals and procedures.

In the Energy Commission

structure, the Chairman, and at times the members of the Commission play this role.

The result is that the role of the Executive

Director is not well defined.
Chairman?

Does he work directly for the

Is he the person responsible for staff activities?

Is

the staff answerable to the Director, to the Chairman, or to a
committee of the Commission?
Even the Chairman•s role in this area is not clear, for while
the statute may call for the Chairman to direct the staff, all the
Commissioners at times become involved with staff products and
resources.

The insights of the Ash Council may be instructive in

this situation.

It noted that "multiheaded management may also

result in a misallocation of agency resources in the absence of
agreement on well-defined priorities.

While a Commission chairman

may have theoretical authority to direct staff activities, as a
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practical matter the staff will be inclined to respond to all
Commissioners.

Thus, allocation of staff resources becomes
difficult to control ... 21 Another aspect of Commissions which
results in staff responding to all Commissioners is the need to
obtain a majority vote.
Misallocation of resources can easily occur when management
is performed by a Commissioner.

The interests of individual Com-

missioners differ and, as a result, program areas of individual
interest are emphasized when there may be areas with more attrac·
tive opportunities for results.

This occurs at the Commission

when the program preferences of various Commissioners are introduced into staff budgets without a systematic set of priorities.
The Auditor General recently noted that the Commission has spent
millions of dollars for its research program without setting
priorities and has focused its resources in areas with relatively
low energy potentia1. 22 In summary, this situation is a good
example of resource allocation based on the interests of various
Commissioners rather than on a system of carefully defined
priorities.
The statutory direction of staff by the Chairman also reduces
staff independence.

It may sometimes be difficult to tell where

staff products end and Commissioner decisions begin.

The Biennial

Report, for example, is the central regulatory document for the
state.

More than one Commissioner is helping to draft this docu-

ment and is reviewing and approving outlines and forecast results.
Commissioners, after participating in the drafting of the Report
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are then to sit in judgment on it and hear arguments for its
revision; a task they cannot expect to conduct with the requisite
dispassion.

The staff, on the other hand, is expected to present

an independent view and defend its product--a task they cannot
perform with the necessary freedom or vigor if they have not had
a completely free hand in preparing the initial Report.

These

overlaps in the functions of staff and Commissioners result from
a structural flaw which combines

r~gulatory

and administrative

functions.
Alternatives Development Program
One of the more novel features of the Warren-Alquist Act is
its mandates for the development of alternative energy sources
that are of unique benefit to the State.

The Act encourages

research and promotional activities to accelerate the development
of these alternatives.

There is, however, doubt whether in the

four years since its creation the Commission has carried out
these mandates.

Several studies have noted the Commission's lack

of precision in defining development goals and objectives and its
failure to establish research priorities.

Inadequate and unde-

fined objectives have reduced the state's contribution to development programs and have limited the use of alternatives in resource
planning.
In the last two budget years, the Legislative Analyst has
criticized the Commission's research and development program.
his fiscal 1978-79 analysis of the budget, the Analyst stated
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In

that the Commission's research budget contained:
...... insufficient detail with respect to the purpose,
expected products and timeliness of proposed research
projects. Of major importance is that the report
lacks precision in stating what the Commission would
do with the results of the proposed study or research.
In many cases, our discussions with the Commission's
staff indicate that plans are, in fact, incomplete
or vague and that the problem lies d~~per than the
semantic differences in the report."
This same lack of precision was noted by the Auditor General
in his recent report on the Commission's research program.
report states that

11

The

the current planning process is insufficient

to ensure maximum benefits from future resources spent on research
of energy alternatives 11 • 24 The report recommends a number of
changes to insure that research projects are ranked in order of
priority, that quantifiable objectives and milestones are established, that literature search is conducted before research is
begun, that research projects receive peer review, and that a
formal monitoring system is established.
Without clear directions and sound management practices, the
state's alternatives program cannot contribute significantly to
the acceleration of alternative resources development.

Policy has

not been established clearly in this area and continues to suffer
from a lack of well-defined objectives.

This vague direction and

lack of planning indicates that the state's efforts in alternative
energy development are inadequate.
Public Participation
Public participation in energy decisions is reduced because
there is no articulated and understandable energy policy.
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Public

participation is affected by an inconsistent commitment the state
has made to providing the public with the means to participate.
Each of the several agencies responsible for energy planning and
programs has different procedures for public input.
The Commission recently revised its procedures in the siting
cases to provide for more informal hearings.

It has also in-

creased the role of the 'Public Advisor and the Commission's
ability to attract the public's interest.

These activities are

not replicated by other agencies, such as the ARB and PUC.

These

agencies play a more traditional role by providing the public with
time to comment on proposed decisions, but have no institutional
program for the public's involvement ·tn the decision process, even
though their decisions are essential ingredients in energy use
and development.
Providing consistent procedures for public participation
would assure that energy decisions are made with substantial
involvement as well as comment by the public.

Energy agencies

need to address this issue.
Combining Regulatory and Administrative Processes
The Warren-Alquist Act gives the Commission responsibility
for the four major energy functions: planning and forecasting,
power plant siting, conservation and alternatives development.
In theory, placing these responsibilities in one agency provides
for a comprehensive and systematic analysis of energy problems and
options.

The combination insures that the interrelationships

among each of these functions are not lost by separating their
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administration.

The effectiveness of each function is increased

because these interrelationships are recognized by common administration.
The Warren-Alquist Act also combines two processes.

The

Commission has both regulatory and administrative responsibilities.
The regulatory process requires an open forum for debate and for
weighing evidence from all interested parties.

A commissioner in

this role is required to be a dispassionate trier of fact; he or
she should be as free as possible from prejudice.

The administra-

tive process, on the other hand, requires program development and
operation, policy analysis, and advocacy.

An administrator in

this role must exercise policy leadership by proposing solutions
to general problems and advocating policy preferences.
of the two processes has distinct features.
ope~ates

Thus, each

The regulatory process

primarily on a case-by-case basis and renders final

decisions; the administrative process proposes alternatives and
promotes their adoption.
The Warren-Alquist Act has placed the same individual in the
impossible dual role of judge and advocate.

The integrity and

credibility of the regulatory process is reduced by the perception
that it is compromised for administrative goals.

The regulatory

process becomes viewed as a vehicle for the effectuation of administrqtive policy to the extent that the judge in the regulatory
process is also an advocate of policies which can influence that
process.
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Many of the functions performed by the Commission are
implemented through both the regulatory and administrative
process.

The Commission's conservation program, for example,

requires the adoption of building and appliance standards and the
promotion of conservation through education and outreach programs.
Power plant siting requires the certification of proposed sites
and facilities and also the early site screening and ranking to
plan for future development.

The development of alternative

technologies may require demonstration

projects and also the

licensing of these same projects in the siting process.

The

Commission's structure gives commissioners final authority for
both regulatory and administrative pr.ocesses.
For example, on February 1, 1979, the SWRCB held a workshop
on the proposal of the Department of Water Resources (DWR) to
construct a coal facil -ity to · pro"duc-e electriCity -fo·r-rflesfate "
Water Project.

At this workshop, the Chairman of the Energy Com-

mission urged DWR to use coal-fired power plants and indicated
that coal is environmentally safe.

This advocacy would be

important for any effort to develop a program for use of particular resources, but the fa-ct that tnis same 1ndlvlaifar-w1lT-als_o______
be asked to sit in judgment of this particular project compromises
his adjudicatory role.

The Chairman's advocacy for a particular

fuel, proper in an administration process, is imprudent when combined with a regulatory process that requires impartial judgment.
Another example is the recent memorandum sent to members of
the Advisory Committee.

This memorandum was to update the fore-

cast and give an initial indication of available or planned
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resources to meet needs.

The memorandum indicated that elec-

trical demand showed a decrease over the past several years and
the trend was expected to continue.

This lower demand figure

would allow the state•s utilities to defer 2000 MW of planned
construction by 1985 and 6000 MW by 1990.

This memorandum was

signed by a commissioner who will soon be asked to make an
independent judgment to adopt a forecast and hear all issues
openly and objectively.

This is a difficult situation when an

initial judgment has been made.
This combination of the regulatory and administrative processes
also reduces the resources devoted to promotional programs.

There

is a tendency in any system that contains elements of the regulatory and administrative processes for the regulatory process to
dominate the system.

The regulatory process is one in which the

immediate needs for information and staff resources are dramatic.
The regulatory process generates most of the controversy and
attention from the public and the political bodies of the state.
If the theory of the

11

pinching shoe 11 or

11

squeaky wheel

11

have any

validity, they will operate here.
Evidence of this drift in resources toward regulatory
activity is already apparent.

Currently, over 60 percent of the

Commission budget is devoted to regulatory activity.

The trend in

the last two budget years has been to reduce the promotional
activities in far greater proportions than other areas.

The

Governor•s 1978-79 proposed budqet had 241 person-years devoted to
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conservation and alternatives development. ·The 1979-80 proposed
budget has 152 person-years devoted to these same areas.

While

all programs in the Commission were reduced in recent years, the
siting and assessments programs were reduced less (12%) than
conservation {50%) or alternatives development ll9%) from the 1978-79
proposed budget.

In addition, the reductions within the conser-

vation program, itself, were made by reducing promotional
activity and maintaining regulatory programs.
Another useful indication of where institutional energy is
applied is the time spent by decision-makers on each of these
areas.

An examination of the Commisston calendar for January 29,

1979, through March 28, 1979, shows over 75% of the hearing days
are devoted to siting cases or regulations, and the remaining 25%
devoted to business meetings or the Biennial Report.
Commissions are compelled both by public pressure and the
law to concentrate on the regulatory process.

Committees of

commissions, formed for regulatory purposes, tend to absorb
resources without a clear view of how their activities affect
the total quality of the Commission, because the press of cases
is directly related to their reputation and role as judges.
Warren-Alquist Act has "built in"

thes~

conflicts; they are real

and they are damaging, but they are avoidable.
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OPTIONS FOR REORGANIZATION
ACR 177 requires the examination of three basic options for
reorganizing energy functions.

These options are:

(1) reorgani-

zing the Energy Commission; (2) replacing the Energy Commission
with a new or alternate agency; and (3) reallocating functions
among the various agencies with energy responsibilities.

There

are other variations of these three alternatives, but this section
discusses only the three options in ACR 177.

Each of the three

options will be presented with an explanation and the essential
arguments for or against its adoption.
REORGANIZING THE ENERGY COMMISSION
This option would retain the Energy Commission with most or
all of its present authority and would make changes to the
Commission's processes and functions.

External change, such as

the creation of a Resource Council, and internal changes, such
as the election of the Chairman of the Commission by his peers,
and separating the responsibilities of the staff and the
Commissioners, are some of the reorganizational options.

In

addition, changes to the Commission's processes and programs, such
as a common timetable for all agencies' reviews in siting proposals, are included in this option, as well as resource planninq.
Resource Council
A Resource Council could be created either bv executive
order or by statute.

The Council would be composed of the heads

of the various departments or agencies in state government which
are responsible for resource management or regulation.
1 17

The

Council would be chaired by the Governor, or his designee, and
would be responsible for coordinating the activities of the
various departments to ensure that resource policies do not conflict with resource programs.

The Council would provide political

accountability for resource and energy decisions by making the
Governor responsible for coordinating major resources programs.
Regulatory coordination could be ensured by requiring the relevant
agencies to provide input to regulatory processes in a timely
manner.

For example, the ARB would be required to comment on a

time certain basis on an NOI which is before the Energy Commission.
The ARB would also be required to comment on the feasibility of
proposals in the Biennial Report.

Conflicts between agencies

would be resolved by the Governor.
Pro - The argument for a Resource Council points to the
ever-increasing complexity of resource-related decisions.

These

decisions must be coordinated in a way that allows responsibility
to be fixed and accountability to be clearly assigned.
Society's conflicting views on resource priorities will
complicate decisions affecting resources.

For example, the need

for cleaner air may run counter to the desire for more energy
development.

The Resource Council would provide the coordination

necessary to arrive at clear decisions in the regulatory process
while maintaining the integrity of each of the agencies involved.
As one proponent of this view has stated, "These functions should
neither substitute nor replace existing decision-making authority
now vested in the Governor, Legislative and executive branch
agencies."l
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Con - The Governor currently has the authority to establish the
oroppsed Resource Council.

~any

of the Council •s functions, however,

should be performed by the Resources Agency itself.

Adding a

Council on top of the existing departments, boards, and commissions
is likely only to add to the present confusion and uncertainty.
One of the problems at which a Resources Council is directed
is the unilateral action of departments and commissions.

To

leave these agencies with their respective authority does not
solve the problem of

interagency cooperation.

This is particu-

larly true of independent commissions not subject to executive
control.

The Council would have no authority to require actions,

and the Governor would have limited control over many decisions.
It is far better to require coordination by statute using policy
as a regulatory instrument than to rely on meetings of a large
Council to resolve issues.

The Resource Council would simply

add another level of uncertainty to the present process without
any assurance of affecting energy decisions.
Separation of Staff Functions
The Warren-Alquist Act mandates the Chairman to direct the
staff, subject to the policies of the Commission.

One internal

change is for the Executive Director to be solely responsible for
the administration of the staff.

Variations on this option would

have both legal counsel and line staff reporting to the Director.
This change would allegedly provide some separation between the
functions of the Commission and the staff.

The Director, under

this proposal, would serve at the pleasure of the Commission.
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Pro - Many have suggested the need for the staff to have a
greater degree of independence than it now has.

Statutes requir-

ing the Director to be responsible for the staff•s activities
will align the respective responsibilities of the Commissioners
and staff more appropriately.

This change was recently made in

the Puc•s organization and has had beneficial effects in increasing staff accountability.
Con - Merely proclaiming the Director to be responsible for
the staff, however, may not overcome four years of precedent at
the Energy Commission.

The Commission regularly experiences in-

volvement by Commissioners ,-;, - sta.rf

·a-ctivftfe·s ~ -a-nd

·this will not

be eliminated by simply saying it should no longer occur.

Argua-

bly, as long as the Commissioners can remove the Director, there
will not be any sense of staff independence.

Commissioners will

continue to be involved in staff activities.

---

The direction of the staff by the Chairman is necessary
to provide more political accountability and allow for the Governor to have influence over what otherwise would be an entrenched
bureaucracy.

Direction of the staff by the Chairman insures that

policy changes can be effected in a commission form of organization.
Elected Chairman
A related proposal is for the Commission to elect its Chairperson for a specified term from among the member&;

the Governor

currently appoints the Chairman.
Pro - Changing the present method of selecting the Chairman
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introduces an element of consensus into the Commission•s proceedings.

Currently, the Chairman does not require the support of

his peers in order to retain the position.

Were he required to

build support among his colleagues, it would promote collegiality
and more agreement on policy.

It could also provide the appro-

priate basis for leadership of a collegial body.
Con - The Governor•s appointment of a Chairman allows the

•

Governor to have some influence over the operations of commissions .
The Governor would not otherwise have this influence since commissioners• terms are fixed, and staggered.

The appointed Chair-

man can bring the Governor•s policies into what might otherwise
be an organization unresponsive to new policy direction.

Pro-

ponents of this view point to the recent study of the PUC performed
for the State Senate, which recommended that the Governor select
the Chairman of the PUC. 2
Common Timetable
One of the continuing problems noted earlier is the multiplicity of agencies exercising permit and planning authority over
some aspect of energy development.

These agencies have not co-

ordinated their activities in either the regulatory process or
the planning process.

One method of providing coordination is to

require, by statute, each of the agencies, such as the ARB, the
PUC, the SWRCB and others, to become involved early in the process.
A common timetable for review would require their input into both
the regulatory process and the planning process on a time-certain
basis.

The ARB, for example, could be required to make a
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determination on air quality during the NOI; the PUC could be
required to make a financial determination during the NOI.
These agencies• views and their determinations of feasibility
would also be required in the Biennial Report.

Thus, the Bi-

ennial Report would indicate the likelihood that a particular
project could meet state and federal standards, and whether sufficient mitigation measures were available.
This common timetable would require placing the present
ARB-Energy Commission agreement into statute and would extend
its operation to the planning process.

Also, changes would need

to be made in the current statutes which require the PUC to issue
its certificate subsequent to the Energy Commission's decision
on the AFC.3
Pro - The above changes are intended to bring all energyrelated agencies into a common framework where decisions can be
made in a specified time.

Many of the resource agencies admin-

ister permit programs which affect energy development projects.
Unless an initial determination on these issues is made early
in the process, substantial time and money can be expended with
no results.

Occurrence such as that in the Sundesert case, where

one agency approves a site and another subsequently makes constructiion impossible, should be avoided.
Con - On the other hand, requiring agencies to finalize
initial judgments may not increase cooperation.

Placing decision

requirements into statute may produce inflexibility and eventually
create more mercurial decisions as agencies discover information
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which alters their initial judgments.

The agreement between

the ARB and the Commission indicates that agencies may be able
to resolve many problems on their own.
Resource Planning
Resource planning refers to the process of preparing to
meet future electricity needs with appropriate resources.

This

requires that fuel type, capacity, plant type, and perhaps general location of new facilities be defined early enough to plan,
obtain permits, and construct new facilities.

Currently, util-

ities perform this function; the state has little or no role.
The PUC, however, in a recent PG&E rate case, required PG&E to
produce a resource plan which will emphasize cogeneration and
other alternatives.4

The Energy Commission•s role in resource

planning is limited to defining commercially available technologies and analyzing alternatives to utility proposals.
There are several possible roles which the state might assume.

The state could continue to play little or no role and

leave resource planning to the utilities.

Another option would

be for state government to provide direction to the utilities by
formally commenting on their supply proposals.

Such proposals

are currently submitted both to the Commission as part of its
forecast procedures and to the PUC for rate purposes.

There is

currently no formal mechanism for the state to approve these plans.
This procedure would increase minimally the state•s current role
in resource planning.
The state could also approve resource plans for utilities.
Under this approach, utilities would submit their proposed plans
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to a state agency 10 or 15 years in advance of construction.
The agency would review the plans and discuss them with the utility and the public to arrive at an approved resource plan which
would be binding on the utility and the state.

These plans would

be reviewed and approved every two years.
Finally, the state could assume the role of resource planner
and replicate utility activities in the resource planning area.
Here, the state would assume the responsibility to plan for meeting future electrical demand by prescribing the amount and kind
of resources to be used in the future.

Such a state-imposed plan

would be binding upon the utilities.
Pro - Utilities are regulated to insure that their operations are performed in the public interest.

Utilities are re-

quired to meet the service requirements of their customers, but
have always maintained that the manner in which they render service should be left to their discretion.

During the last decade,

however, approval of facilities has been difficult because 't he
public's view of preferred resources did not mesh with the utilities' view.

The only way the state can take an active role in

electrical policy is to influence the choice of resources in a
fashion which achieves previously established state policy objectives.

This implies that the state government should be in-

volved early in the planning process to indicate preferred alternatives.
For example, the state's efforts to develop alternative
energy resources cannot have a substantial impact unless the state
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has the capability to guide the utilities• investment into areas
proposed by the state.

Cogeneration, in spite of its potential,

has made little contribution to our electrical resources.

Util-

ities have thus far made only limited efforts to exploit this
potential.
Although the present regulatory system makes decisions about
the type and quantity of the resources to be used, these decisions occur at the wrong part of the planning process.

Currently,

the state develops the criteria to determine which technologies
are commercially available and includes these criteria in the
Biennial Report.

Alternatives to a utility proposal are then

compared and evaluated in the NOI process, where the final requirements of CEQA, relating to consideration of alternatives,
are met.

The problem is that this test of alternatives comes

far too late in the process to be meaningful.

Thus, the state's

influence over resource selection occurs when large amounts of
time and money have been expended on a project.

This decision

should be made earlier in the process when there is time to respond to changes in circumstance or policy.

Having the state ap-

prove or sign off on a resource plan would provide a better framework for energy planning.
Con - Most utilities would object to increasing the state's
role in resource planning because planning for future needs has
always been the utilities• responsibility.

Utilities have the

staff, the expertise, and the incentive to plan for future needs.
Furthermore, the utilities, not the states, bear the responsibility
125

for meeting the public's need for electricity.

The public holds

utilities responsible for inadequate and unreliable service.
State government cannot maintain the staff necessary to
perform these functions.

Resource planning requires individuals

with strong technical backgrounds which may require compensation
beyond the state's capability.

The large number of persons neces-

sary for resource planning will also pose a problem since planning activities require expertise in a number of different disciplines.
Forecasting Issues
The Commission has the responsibility for electricity demand
forecasting, but the PUC retains its responsibility for forecasting natural gas demand.

In forecasting electricity, the Commis-

sion cannot ignore demand for natural gas since for many areas
natural gas is in direct competition with electricity; an

increas~

in natural gas demand may cause a corresponding decrease in electricity use.

The PUC's responsibility is to make short-term fore-

casts for rate-setting purposes.

Short-term forecast methods may

not be appropriate for longer term planning.
One option for altering the present structure is to place
the responsibility for both gas and electricity in one agency.
This structure will assure consistency in energy forecasting.
Pro - Centralizing the entire forecasting function may provide for a more systematic and complete forecasting capability
and may save money by avoiding duplication of effort.
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Centralizing this function may increase the accountability
for forecast results and provide for greater coordination of
interrelated forecasting functions.
Con - The PUC and the Energy Commission use different forecasting methods.
ent uses.

•

Furthermore, the forecasts are put to differ-

There is no apparent reason for placing all forecast-

ing responsibility on one agency, since short- and long-term
forecasting requirements are different.
Conservation Issues
Both the Commission and the PUC have responsibility for
conservation programs.

~he

Commission administers both standard-

setting and promotional programs.

The PUC is responsible for

reviewing and approving utility conservation programs and expendi tures.

The Commission presents testimony before the PUC on util-

ity conservation programs and has a larger resource base, both
in staff and contact funds, upon which to draw.

The possibility

of centralizing the conservation activities of the state in one
agency may create a more consistent conservation program.
question is:
PUC:

The

Should the Commission or the PUC have this authority?

The conservation program conducted by the two agencies

has resulted in some friction over funding sources and criteria
for measuring utility efforts.

Combining the responsibility in

one location may increase both efficiency and effectiveness.

Load

management standards, for example, are established by the Energy
Commission but the rate portions of the standards and utilities'
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costs for their programs must be met by the PUC.

Consolidating

all programs dealing with utilities could produce more effective
results if they were the responsibility of the rate-setting
agency.
Commission:

The Energy Commission has a larger pool of

talent and experience upon which to draw in such matters as building design, appliance operations, residential and business outreach programs, etc.

Conservation programs could be more com-

prehensive and reach a wider audience if total program responsibility were given to the Commission.

The Commission should be

authorized to intervene in PUC cases, as well as municipal utilities' proceedings.
REPLACING THE COMMISSION WITH AN ALTERNATE AGENCY
There are three basic variations on the option of replacing
the Energy Commission with another agency.

First, there is the

alternative of creating a Department of Energy to perform all the
functions now performed by the Energy Commission.

Second, the

functions can be split, some going to existing agencies and some
to a newly-created agency.

Third, all the functions of the Energy

Commission can be transferred to an existing agency.

Although

each of these alternatives has its own variations, only the three
basic alternatives will be discussed.
Department of Energy
This alternative calls for the creation of a Department of
Energy, headed by a pleasure appointee of the Governor, to perform
all the functions now performed by the Energy Commission.
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The

Department, therefore, would be responsible for both regulations
and administrative processes associated with power plant siting,
forecasting, conservation, and alternatives development.

The

electricity surcharge would continue to fund the operations of
the Department, and most of the present Energy Commission staff
would continue in their positions.
Pro - The major purpose of moving to a department structure
rather than a commission is to improve efficiency, accountability,
and coordination.

A commission form of administration tends to

be slow to act, divides authority, lacks accountability, and is
a poor structure for managing ongoing programs.

The department

form of administration is seen as solving these problems.
Departments are more efficient because there is one decisionmaker, not several.

The need for hearings or numerous briefings

on various issues is reduced or eliminated.

Budgets can receive

more expeditious approval; contracts can be executed more quickly,
and staff will receive clear direction.

Business can be conducted

in an administrative fashion rather than a courtroom setting.
Debate is limited and decision points clearly fixed.
Having a pleasure appointee serve as the individual responsible for energy decisions provides a degree of accountability not
found in plural bodies.

Policy directives and decisions can be

appealed directly to the chief executive and public accountability
assured through the Governor's power of removal.

Since energy is

a substantial societal decision, decision-makers should be publicly
accountable.

A department structure cannot only respond quickly to
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changes in circumstances, but can be held responsible if it does
not respond.

Such swiftness of action is needed, especially in

an area where federal activity is increasing.
Departments can provide for increased coordination and better management of staff resources.

Since a department would be

led by one person, it could formulate policy and interagency
agreements without the necessary delay and debate encountered
in a plural body and without the potential for substantial dissent.

Because of clear leadership and the absence of a need to

develop a consensus, staff resources could be more appropriately
used and priorities established along programmatic lines.

There

would be no need to satisfy the various members of a plural body
with their

11

pet 11 projects.

Management in a department setting can operate in a more
traditional mode through a well-defined chain of command with
clear lines of authority.

There would be no dispersion of authori-

ty nor extensive deliberations over management tasks.
Con - A department structure also has weaknesses.

There are

some issues which, because of their complexity and controversial
nature, require debate and deliberation, and where the cultivation,
and even the necessity, of differing · views is vital to sound
policy.

Power plant siting, for example, is a societal decision

which must weigh questions of equity and requires the exercise
of judgment on issues on which there is less-than-perfect knowledge.
As another example, forecasting future energy demand involves
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numerous judgmental decisions.

In these areas debate is needed

and dissent should be invited, both of which are limited in a
department structure.
While a department structure may be expeditious in decisionmaking, it cannot provide the forum for debating essential issues
and cannot insulate the decision-maker from political pressures.
Energy decisions have consequences extending beyond the term of any
particular administration.

Indeed, given the long lead times on

many development projects, the decisions of one Governor may have
very little immediate consequence during his or her administration.
Such decisions should be made by a dispassionate body, insulated
from the political pressures of the day.

This body can debate

the merits of various proposals and be as free as possible from
undue pressure.
Energy issues require some degree of consensus if they are
to have any hope of proving viable.

Consensus can only be built

where there is a forum for debate and a free exchange of ideas.
Consensus is not developed by the promulgation of rules and regulations by a department.

Consensus must be constructed by a plural

body which reflects many of the views that exist in society.

The

representation and debate of these views provide the necessary
elements for decisions which must last for decades.
Functional Split Between a Department and Commission
This alternative calls

for the creation of a department

to perform some functions now performed by the Commission and the
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transfer of other functions to a plural body.

The most familiar

such proposal is to create a department of energy to perform conservation and alternatives development functions and to transfer
the siting and forecasting functions to the PUC.

In essence, this

alternative requires the division of present Commission functions
between a line agency and a commission.
Pro:

The advantages and disadvantages of department and

commission forms of administration were discussed in the previous
section.

The proposal to split the various functions and place

them in the appropriate type of agency has several advantages.
Separating the line-oriented program functions from those of a
regulatory nature prevents the appearance of, and opportunity
for, bias or conflict among functions, preserves the integrity of
the regulatory process, and allows the program functions to be
administered in a more traditional organization.

This can achieve

the best of both worlds by placing functions in the type of agency
best suited for their accomplishment.
For example, creating a department for the performance of
program functions enables the Governor to develop energy programs
according to his policy and provides a vehicle for their administration.

A commission cannot serve this function _because of its

independent status.

The chief executive needs to act upon his or

her policies and should be given the tools to do so.

The depart-

ment, therefore, provides both accountability and flexibility in
the administration of energy programs.
Furthermore, a split along functional lines would allow the
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regulatory responsibilities now performed by the Commission to
continue with a plural body.

Such functions as power plant siting

and forecasting are properly those of a plural body.

These

functions require a forum for debate and public discussion and a
representation of different views.
Transferring the Commission's adjudicatory functions to the
PUC has advantages.

•

The PUC has the capability to administer and

adjudicate these issues since it has experience in the field and
a history of performing quasi-judicial functions.
for long-term forecasting would be combined in

Responsibility

one agency.

This

responsibility is currently divided between the Commission, which
prepares electric forecasts, and the PUC, which prepares gas
forecasts.
Litigation and delays could be limited by the transfer of the
power plant siting respon&ibility to the PUC.

The PUC's decisions

are reviewable directly by the Supreme Court.

This eliminates the

time-consuming and costly litigation that might otherwise occur
at the trial and appellate court level and would provide a savings
to the state and the rate payer by expediting final decisions on
siting cases.
Financial analysis, which is the PUC's responsibility, is
closely linked with development of energy facilities.

The issues

of capital cost and availability, effects of capital expansion
upon the rate base, and the ability of rates to support new capital
facilities are all critical issues to new power plant construction.
Having these issues resolved in one agency will be more effective
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and will provide more certainty in the regulatory process.

Plan-

ning to meet future needs can progress with some assurance that
the future facilities are capable of being financed.
Con:
native.

There are, however, several disaqvantages to this alter-

First, the Warren-Alquist Act purportedly placed respon-

sibility for the four major functions in one agency to insure a
comprehensive approach to regulation and to provide the motivation
for alternatives development.

Splitting the functions among two

or more agencies eliminates this goal.

In practice, such a

split will reduce the ability of the state to have any real policy
impact since regulation is made distant from policy formulation.
How can policy have any real effect when it has no administrative
machinery to implement it?

Can a Department of Energy ensure its

policies will be effective when a major portion of their implementation is carried out by a regulatory agency?
--

- --

Combining the pro-

gram and regulatory processes offers both consistency and impact.
The PUC is not a land use agency; it is an economic regulatory body.

It has little experience and staff to conduct the

necessary investigations and reviews for major land use decisions.
If power plant siting were to be transferred to the PUC, the staff
of the Commission responsible for this function could be transferred to San Francisco with the attendant disruption and loss of
qualified individuals.

In a period of declining state expectations

and reduced ability to attract qualified staff, this disruption
could be a serious problem.

Furthermore, cooperation between

state agencies has been a problem in the states• energy planning
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efforts.

Placing regulatory process in San Francisco while the

administrative process remains in Sacramento will exacerbate the
problem.
The Commission was created partly because of the public•s
view that the PUC, when it was responsible for power plant siting,
was not effective as a siting authority.
PUC is an economic regulatory agency.

As stated previously, the

The PUC may be unable to

balance both economic and land use issues.

A question remains

whether the PUC is better able now than it was in the past to perform the siting function.
Transfer All Energy Commission Functions to PUC
Thi~

option calls for the transfer of all functions presently

performed by the Commission to the PUC.

This will mean that the

PUC will be the agency with authori_ty for power plant siting,
forecasting, conservation, and alternatives development.

All

present PUC functions would be retained and the present membership unaltered.
Pro:

The advantages of this option are similar to those dis-

cussed in the previous section dealing with the split of functions
between a department and a commission.

This would provide for

greater coordination of the siting and financing decisions since
both will be made in the same agency.

There would be more certainty

and expedition in the siting process because the decisions of the
PUC are directly reviewable by the Supreme Court.

Forecasting could

be made more comprehensive by handling both gas and electric demand.
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Con:

This proposal would require a substantial movement of

staff from the Commission to San Francisco, with all the disruption
associated with such a move.

The present regulatory casework would

be interrupted as would any legal proceedings in which the Commission
is involved.

There are presently several cases in the siting process

of the Commission and their disposition would be thrown into confus ion.
The problems identified in third section of this report
(analysis of Energy Commission) concerning the accountability of
commissions, their tendency to be slow to act, their lack of accountability, and their inability to make policy and coordinate decisions, will not be solved by replacing one commission with another.
There is no indication that the PUC is in any better position to
correct the stated problems than the Commission.

This alternative

would also create new problems for the PUC by combining in that
agency both regulatory and administrative processes.

As stated

previously, combining these processes has caused difficulties for
the Commission and will inevitably cause the same problems for the
PUC.

There is little indication that more definitive policy or

better planning and regulation will result from this proposal.
REALLOCATlON OF ENERGY FUNCTIONS
The final category for reorganization is to reallocate energy
responsibilities among appropriate state agencies.

Currently,

energy responsibilities are administered by the Commission, the
PUC, the ARB, the SWRCB, and the Coastal Commission.
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In addition,

agencies such as SolarCal, OAT, and the Solid Waste Management
Board each have responsibility for energy programs.
There are many combinations that can be devised for a reallocation of energy functions.
a review, however.

Three basic patterns emerge from such

First, the siting and forecasting functions of

the Commission can be allocated to another agency.

Second, the

conservation and alternatives development functions of the Commission can be allocated to another agency or several agencies.

Third,

other agencies• responsibilities can be transferred to the Commission.
Transfer of Siting and Forecasting from Energy Commission
The demand forecast, determination of available technologies,
and power plant siting are important

en~rgy

functions.

These

-

.functions could be transferred to the PUC or divided among the
Office of Planning and Research (forecasting and the Biennial
Report) and the PUC (siting).

The Commission could retain the

promotional functions of conservation and alternatives development.
The Commission could participate in the siting and planning process
of the agencies
Pro:

given the siting and planning authority.

The advantages of this form of organization are similar

to those mentioned under the split of functions in second part of
this section.

Assuming that siting and forecasting go to the PUC,

this option has the advantages of consolidating:

1) siting and

rate setting, and 2) gas and electric forecasting.
Con:

The disadvantages of this reallocation are also similar

to those noted in earlier schemes where the regulatory process is
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disrupted and extensive staff movement is required.

In addition,

the Office of Planning and Research is not an appropriate agency to
perform the Biennial Report function or the forecasting function.
OPR is strictly an executive agency and would have difficulty providing the proper forum for debate and dissent needed for adjudicating the forecast.

OPR has an even more difficult task in this

regard because it is totally within the Governor's office and has
little or no functional ties with other agencies, an important factor
in coordination.

Furthermore, OPR's staff would have to be expanded

substantially to prepare the Biennial Report and the forecast.
Since OPR has traditionally had a small staff, they would probably
experience severe "start-up" problems.
This reallocation would leave the Commission administering the
promotional program of conservation and alternatives development.
There is little reason for a commission to be responsible for these
programs.

Commissions are inherently less efficient and lack the

ability to manage staff resources well.

These functions do not

require a five-member, full-time body for their administration.
Transfer of Program Functions From Energy Commission
This alternative is the inverse of the previous alternative.
It removes the program functions from the Commission and transferring
them to agencies such as the Department of Housing and Community
Development (HCD), OAT, SolarCal and other line agencies.

The

Commission would retain authority for forecasting and power plant
siting, making the Commission primarily a regulatory agency.
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Any

agency, or combination of agencies, which already administers
energy-program functions could receive additional program functions.
For example, the PUC has responsibility for utility conservation
and research.

HCD has duties in the building standards area.

OAT

and SolarCal are involved with solar energy designs and buildings.
Those agencies would divide the program activities now performed
by the Commission.
Pro:

The advantages of separating the program functions from

those of regulation
this part.

were discussed earlier in the second section of

The combination of these programs calls into question

the integrity of the regulatory process and may blunt the effectiveness of the promotional programs.

Placing these programs in line

organizations allows the necessary flexibility, speed of action
and accountability needed to provide leadership in these areas.
The Governor would be able to make changes in policy and direction
and could influence new state programs in areas where direct influence is appropriate.
Con:

The disadvantages of this alternative differs from those

of creating a department for programs and transferring the regulatory activities to the PUC.

Here many of the conservation and alter-

natives programs would be fragmented, rather than mutually supportive.

For example, setting conservation standards for buildings

could be assigned to MCD, but promotional conservation programs
might be the responsibility of OAT.

Separating the programs

reduces their effectiveness because there are a number of interrelationships within each area.
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Passive solar design techniques,

for example, can be encouraged by well-designed building performance
standards.

Separating these programs may result in less effective

programs.
Another potential disadvantage to this alternative is the
disruption it would produce in the present system.

Staff from

the Commission working in the conservation and alternatives area
would be transferred to several different state agencies; creating
some displacement and potential morale problems.
Increased Authority for the Energy Commission
As indicated earlier, agencies such as the ARB, PUC, SWRCB,
and the Coastal Commission, all have responsibilities relating to
energy development and use.

These functions, as they relate pri-

marily to power plant siting, could be performed by the Commission.
The Commission, therefore, could issue the permit for air quality
in new power plants and determine the ability of utilities to
finance new facilities.

The purpose of the increased authority is

to create a "one stop shop" for permits for new power plants.
Applicants would receive or be denied a permit for new plants in
one agency.

There may be conflicts with federal law in some of

these areas, however.
The Commission could also assume the present energy programs
of OAT, SolarCal, and other related agencies.

This would centralize

conservation and alternatives development activities.
Pro:

The desire for a one-stop agency for power plant siting

has been expressed on numerous occasions, and proposals have often
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0

been put forward in the Legislature.
saving time and money.

Its advantages are obvious

Without the multitude of permit agencies

to go to, the utilities could expedite construction of needed
facilities and reduce delays and expenses.
0

Placing these functions

in one agency may also assist in providing the balance between the
requirement for new energy facilities and protection of air and
water quality and increase the efforts to mitigate environmental
impacts of development.

The one-stop shop could also reduce the

present level of uncertainty that exists with air quality requirements and other resource issues.

One agency could now make both

permit determination and provide the early signals on feasibility
and potential mitigation measures.
Con:

The disadvantages of transforming these functions

relates to the practicality of making the changes.

There is almost

no way for the Energy Commission or any other commission to replicate all the talents contained in agencies such as the PUC, ARB,
and SWRCB.

These agencies have a staff of experts in the various

scientific, engineering, and financial matters which are needed
to perform their program regardless of the power plant work performed by the Commission.

Therefore, even if the Commission

could replicate their talents, there would be duplication of efforts.
It is by far more preferable to work on a common timetable such as
that contained in the ARB-Commission agreement.
There is substantial doubt that if the state provided for

D

the Commission to issue permits for air quality or other programs
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administered in part under federal law, that the respective federal
agencies would authorize such a move.

For example, it is question-

able whether EPA would allow two state agencies to be responsible
for air quality regulation.

Such a transfer is likely to cause

confusion and may not accomplish anything.
Each of the agencies discussed above was created to solve a
serious problem or regulate various activities in the public
interest.

There has been no determination that energy needs are

any more important than the needs of these other areas.
development more important than clean water or air?

Is energy

There may be

instances where the requirements of energy and other resources conflict, but this conflict should not automatically be resolved in
favor of energy development.
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